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I. INTRODUCTION
International law is no longer conceived of as regulating the rights and
obligations of states alone, yet any suggestion that nonstate actors could or
should play a role in the creation of international law remains highly
controversial. States jealously guard their lawmaking powers as a key attribute
of statehood, making them generally resistant to the idea of sharing such
powers with any nonstate actors. States are particularly hostile to the possibility
of granting nonstate armed groups a lawmaking role, given states' perceptions
of the illegitimacy of and threat posed by such actors. Nonetheless, we argue
that it is time to reconsider whether it is possible and desirable for nonstate
actors to play a role in the making of international law. In particular, we set out
the case for granting nonstate armed groups a limited role in the creation of
international humanitarian law.
Recent decades have seen a significant expansion of the international
humanitarian rules regulating the conduct of states and armed groups in
noninternational armed conflicts. Historically, the principal concern of
international humanitarian law was the regulation of inter-state armed conflicts.
Until the mid-1990s, only a handful of provisions applied to the actions of
states and armed groups in noninternational armed conflicts.' Since then,
numerous treaties have been drafted or revised to regulate noninternational
2armed conflicts. Customary international humanitarian law has undergone a
similar expansion. Many of the rules that previously governed only states in
international armed conflicts now apply to both states and armed groups in
noninternational armed conflicts. 3
1. See, e.g., Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of Noninternational Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), June 8, 1977, 1125
U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter Additional Protocol Il]; Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in
the Event of Armed Conflict art. 19, May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 240; Geneva Convention for the
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field art. 3, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217,
75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 3,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135. An earlier approach to the
regulation of noninternational armed conflicts used the concept of recognition of belligerency.
Nonetheless, such recognition occurred infrequently and has not taken place for many years. See ERIK J.
S. CASTRtN, CIVIL WAR 97-206 (1966).
2. See, e.g., Convention on Cluster Munitions, Dec. 3, 2008, 48 I.L.M. 357; Second Protocol
to the Hague Convention of 1954 for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict,
Mar. 26, 1999, 2253 U.N.T.S. 172; Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production
and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, Sept. 18, 1997, 2056 U.N.T.S. 211
[hereinafter Ottawa Convention]; Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain
Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or To Have Indiscriminate
Effects, Oct. 10, 1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 137 (as amended, and the Protocols thereto); see also Convention
on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on
their Destruction, Sept. 3, 1992, 21 T.S. 35597, 1974 U.N.T.S. 45; Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on
Their Destruction, Apr. 10, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 583, 1015 U.N.T.S. 163. The latter two conventions prohibit
the use of chemical and biological weapons, respectively, "under any circumstances," thus including
situations of noninternational armed conflict.
3. The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) led the way by
holding that many of the rules governing international armed conflicts also applied to noninternational
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But with this growth comes an anomaly. The established doctrine of
sources recognizes three sources of international law: treaties, custom, and
general principles. Under this doctrine, states, and only states, make
international law by entering into treaties or through the recognition of
customary rules or general principles based on states' views and practices.4 The
rationale behind this approach has been simple. Traditionally, only states were
seen as having rights, duties, and enforcement capacities under international
law. Therefore only states were understood as subjects of international law. At
the same time, long-standing notions of voluntarism dictated that international
law must be derived from the consent of those it governed. International law
was thus understood as the sum total of obligations consented to by states and
binding upon those states.
This reasoning does not hold when applied to noninternational armed
conflicts. Only states create the international humanitarian law that governs the
conduct of both states and armed groups.5 In international armed conflicts, the
practice and views of both parties to the conflict play a role in creating the
international law that regulates such conflicts and by which the parties are
bound. In nonintemational armed conflicts, by contrast, the practice of either
some of the parties (if the conflict is between a state and one or more armed
groups) or all of the parties (if the conflict is between two or more armed
groups) is excluded from consideration. As international humanitarian law
now treats nonstate armed groups as subjects rather than mere objects of
international law, it is worth questioning whether nonstate armed groups can
and should be given a role in the creation of the international law that governs
conflicts to which they are parties.
armed conflict. See Prosecutor v. Tadid, Case No. IT-94-1-1, Decision on Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 1 119 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995).
This approach was effectively endorsed by a majority of states in negotiations leading to the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC). See Allison Marston Danner, When Courts Make Law:
How the International Criminal Tribunals Recast the Laws of War, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1, 25-37 (2006);
Claus Kress, War Crimes Committed in Noninternational Armed Conflict and the Emerging System of
International Criminal Justice, 30 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 103, 104-07 (2000). A recent study on
customary international humanitarian law, concluded under the auspices of the International Committee
of the Red Cross (ICRC), found that all but a handful of the rules it identified applied in international
and noninternational armed conflicts alike. JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK,
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, at xxviii-xxix (2005).
4. See Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 33
U.N.T.S. 993 (referring to international conventions, international custom, and general principles of
law). Although Article 38 lists the sources that the International Court of Justice (ICJ) should use in
deciding cases, it is generally taken to reflect the sources of international law more generally. See IAN
BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 5 (2008); 1 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL
LAW: PEACE 24, § 9 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992).
5. See Sandesh Sivakumaran, Binding Armed Opposition Groups, 55 INT'L & COMP. L.Q.
369 (2006).
6. The rules governing international humanitarian law typically are premised on a distinction
between international armed conflicts (conflicts between two or more states) and noninternational armed
conflicts (conflicts between a state and a nonstate armed group or between two or more nonstate armed
groups). Although inter-state conflicts are by definition international, conflicts between states and
nonstate armed groups can be internal to one state or have a cross-border element. We adopt the
language of noninternational armed conflicts in this Article to distinguish these conflicts from inter-state
armed conflicts. We do not view our analysis as limited to conflicts that take place within a single state.
See Anthea Roberts, Righting Wrongs or Wronging Rights? The United States and Human Rights Post-
September 11, 15 EUR. J. INT'L L. 721, 746-48 (2004).
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In Part I, we provide a framework for understanding the potential for
nonstate entities to play a role in making public international law. The typically
accepted dichotomy between states and nonstate entities is unhelpful in
analyzing this issue because it reinforces the view that states and only states
make international law, while obscuring important differences between various
types of nonstate entities. We argue that any normative evaluation of whether
nonstate entities should be granted a lawmaking role requires one to adopt an
analytical framework that is capable of distinguishing between states, state-
empowered bodies (such as the United Nations and the International Court of
Justice) and nonstate actors (such as individuals, corporations, and armed
groups). Focusing on the last category, we outline a variety of justifications for
granting some or all nonstate actors a role in lawmaking. We conclude,
however, that whether and how a particular nonstate actor should participate in
law creation depends, at least in part, on the advantages and disadvantages of
recognizing such a role for that particular type of actor. We argue that this
analysis should be judged from the perspective of the international community
as a whole rather than from the viewpoint of states alone.
In Part II, we apply this test to determine whether armed groups should be
given a role in the creation of international humanitarian law applicable in
noninternational armed conflict.7 This issue has received very little attention to
date; no systematic studies have been conducted on the potential costs and
benefits of recognizing such a role. Drawing on existing but rarely discussed
practices, we argue that recognizing a limited lawmaking role for some armed
groups could create significant benefits (such as increasing a sense of
ownership and compliance) and that some of the possible costs of doing so
have been overplayed (such as inappropriately legitimizing armed groups and
affecting their legal status). We do not argue that armed groups should be given
the same lawmaking roles as states. Instead, we propose an approach that
would accommodate the practices of armed groups within a less statist
approach to the doctrine of sources of international humanitarian law. We
recognize that any proposal for including armed groups in the process of law
creation will be met by a host of theoretical and practical objections.
Nonetheless, we set out a lawmaking paradigm that allows for constructive
engagement with armed groups without downgrading the standards of
international humanitarian law, treating armed groups as akin to states, or
granting them a comparable role to states in the creation of international
humanitarian law.
7. We have chosen this case study for two reasons. First, nonstate armed groups play a
particular role in noninternational armed conflicts-both when the conflict is internal to one country and
when it has a cross-border element. Armed groups are one of the "parties to the conflict" and they
operate under the principle of equality of obligation with respect to the law. Accordingly, the example
represents an acute instance of international law being created by states but being binding on both states
and nonstate actors. Second, armed groups produce a wealth of materials relating to humanitarian
norms, including unilateral declarations, ad hoc agreements with states and international organizations,
and codes of conduct. These materials are overlooked and their normative status remains uncertain,
largely because they fail to fit within the traditional doctrine of sources. For examples, see infra Part
II.c.
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II. NONSTATE ACTORS AND INTERNATIONAL LAWMAKING
A. Challenges to the Statist Doctrine ofSources
International law has traditionally been defined as the law created by and
governing relations between states. This is reflected in a highly statist doctrine
of sources that recognizes states, and only states, as the creators of international
law. The sources of international law are generally considered to be those listed
in Article 38(1) of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) Statute,8 namely:
international conventions ... establishing rules expressly recognized by the
contesting states;
international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; [and]
. .. judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists
of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of
law.
Article 38 is considered the cornerstone of positivist approaches to
international law because it distinguishes legal obligations from nonlegal
practice. The provision distinguishes between three sources (treaties, custom,
and general principles) and two subsidiary means of determining the law
(judicial decisions and academic writings). This distinction reflects a
state/nonstate division. States can create international law by, for example,
entering into treaties or having their practices and views form the basis of
customary international law and general principles. By contrast, the work of
nonstate entities, such as courts and academics, are not sources of international
law but rather provide only a subsidiary means of identifying international law.
This statist approach to the doctrine of sources is based on two principles
found within traditional conceptions of international law. First, only states are
subjects of international law-meaning that states are the sole entities that
enjoy rights and obligations under international law, as well as the capacity to
enforce international law in certain circumstances.' 0 Objects, by contrast, can
be the focus or beneficiaries of international law, but cannot independently hold
international legal rights or obligations, let alone enforce such rights or
obligations on the international stage. Following this approach, nonstate entities
such as individuals and armed groups-like cattle, rivers, or territory-were
considered to be objects rather than subjects of international law."
8. BROWNLIE, supra note 4, at 5; 1 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW: PEACE, supra note
4, at 24 § 9.
9. G.M. DANILENKO, LAWMAKING IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 14-15 (1993);
Bruno Simma & Andreas L. Paulus, The Responsibility of Individuals for Human Rights Abuses in
InternalArmed Conflicts: A Positivist View, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 302, 304 (1999).
10. LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 341 (1905) ("Since the Law of
Nations is a law between states only and exclusively, states only and exclusively are subjects of the Law
of Nations.").
I1. See, e.g., 1 GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW 140-42 (3d ed. 1957);
George Manner, The Object Theory of the Individual in International Law, 46 AM. J. INT'L L. 428, 428-
29 (1952). Not only did individuals not hold international rights or obligations, but any wrongs against
them were cast as injuries to their state of nationality, resulting in that state having complete discretion
2012] 111
112 THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 37: 1
Second, classical positivist justifications based on "voluntarism" require
international law to be derived from the consent of those it governs.12
According to this view, as states are the only subjects of international law, and
are sovereign equals, states must also be the only entities capable of creating
the laws by which they are bound.13 As expressed in the Lotus case,
"International law governs relations between independent States. The rules of
law binding upon States therefore emanate from their own free will . . ..
This view holds that only states, as the sole subjects of international law, can
create international law and can agree to be bound by it.
Significant inroads have been made into the first principle: we now accept
that a broad range of nonstate entities possesses rights and duties under
international law, as well as the capacity to enforce those rights in certain
circumstances.' 5 The concept of subjecthood under international law has
widened to include a variety of nonstate entities, such as individuals
(particularly under international human rights, investment, and criminal law)
and international organizations (such as the United Nations).16 The concept has
also become more differentiated; there is now widespread recognition that
different subjects may possess different rights, obligations, and enforcement
capabilities.' 7
By contrast, there has been little movement with respect to the second
principle. Generally no link is made between nonstate entities having rights,
duties, and enforcement capacities under international law, and their capacity to
play a role in international lawmaking.' 8 The concept of subjecthood has
become less statist, but consensus on how international law is created has
over whether, when, and how to pursue any international claims on their behalf. See, e.g., Barcelona
Traction, Light and Power Co. (BeIg. v. Spain), Second Phase, 1970 I.C.J. 3, % 78-79 (Feb. 5);
Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Greece v. U.K.), 1924 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 2, at 12 (Aug. 30).
12. Simma & Paulus, supra note 9, at 303, 305 (arguing that state consent may be express, as
with treaties, or tacit, as with custom).
13. Steven R. Ratner & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Appraising the Methods of International Law:
A Prospectus for Readers, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 291, 293 (1999) (arguing that international law is "no
more or less than the rules to which states have agreed through treaties, custom, and perhaps other forms
of consent").
14. S.S. "Lotus" (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 18 (Sept. 7).
15. 1 HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW: COLLECTED PAPERS 136 (Elihu
Lauterpacht ed., 1970).
16. Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion,
1949 I.C.J. 174, 178 (Apr. 11); Jurisdiction of the Courts of Danzig, Advisory Opinion, 1928 P.C.I.J.
(ser. B) No. 15, at 17 (Mar. 3).
17. For example, the ICJ recognized that the United Nations was subject to international law
but noted that this did not mean that it was a state or that its "legal personality and rights and duties
[were] the same as those of a State." Reparation for Injuries, 1949 I.C.J. at 179. The ICJ has held that
the Vienna Convention on Consular Rights creates substantive rights for signatory states and their
nationals. LaGrand (Ger. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466, 77 (June 27). Some human rights regimes grant
substantive and procedural rights to natural and legal persons. See, e.g., Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 34, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221. Investment treaties
grant investors procedural rights to enforce investment protections. See, e.g., Convention on the
Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States arts. 25, 36, Mar. 18,
1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159.
18. See generally, KATE PARLETT, THE INDIVIDUAL IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM:
CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2011) (arguing that individuals, not just states,
have rights, obligations and capacities under international law but only if and to the extent recognized by
states).
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remained highly statist. And the notion of voluntarism-that international law
must be derived from the consent of those bound by it-rarely prompts
discussion of whether nonstate actors should be entitled to play some role in
authoring the laws that bind them. Nonetheless, there have been some
normative and descriptive challenges to the traditional position that only states
create international law.
On a normative level, modem positivists endorse the need for a doctrine
of sources in order to distinguish law from non-law. They are prepared,
however, to recognize that a limited range of actors other than states may play a
role in codifying and progressively developing international law. Thus, Bruno
Simma and Andreas Paulus suggest that the notion of state practice could be
widened to include the practice and decisions of a narrow category of
international bodies, such as the International Law Commission (ILC) and the
ICJ. 9 Although they acknowledge that various nonstate actors, including
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), global economic players, and the
global media, play an increasingly important role in the international
community, Simma and Paulus do not consider this role to extend to law
* 20creation.
Process theorists, by contrast, have moved away from the positivist focus
on distinguishing between law and non-law, instead viewing law as an ongoing
process of authoritative decisionmaking by various actors.21 According to
proponents of the New Haven and "international law as a transnational legal
process" schools, a wide range of actors other than states influences this
decision-making process and thus the development of international law.22
However, these "authorized decision-makers" remain predominantly state
actors (such as makers of foreign policy) and actors empowered by states (such
as international courts), even if they are influenced by NGOs, individuals, and
others.
On a descriptive level, international law does recognize that nonstate
entities may play some role in lawmaking, but these instances tend to be treated
as ad hoc exceptions. For example, international organizations can enter into
treaties with states or each other, under which they accept rights and
obligations related to their functions.23 Debate remains, however, over whether
states can enter into treaties with subjects of international law that are neither
states nor international organizations. 24 The ILC, when preparing a draft of
19. Simma & Paulus, supra note 9, at 306-07.
20. Id. at 306.
21. ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND How WE USE IT
39-55 (1994); Ratner & Slaughter, supra note 13, at 293-94.
22. See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J.
2599, 2626 (1997); W. Michael Reisman, The View from the New Haven School of International Law,
86 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 118, 122 (1992).
23. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Between States and International Organizations
or Between International Organizations, Mar. 21, 1986, 25 I.L.M. 543 (1986) [hereinafter VCLT-lO].
24. Different interpretations are also given to Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of
the UnitedNations, Advisory Opinion, 1949 I.C.J. 174, 178 (Apr. I1). Some attempt to limit its scope to
state-created bodies, while others see it as establishing broader principles applicable to all nonstate
actors. Compare Alexander Orakhelashvili, The Position of the Individual in International Law, 31 CAL.
1132012]
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what was to become the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT),
considered the possibility of various other subjects entering into treaties with
states, but ultimately excluded the issue from the VCLT's purview.2 5 States
have entered into agreements with indigenous peoples, armed groups, and
foreign investors, but the legal status of these agreements is disputed.2 6
Outside the context of treaties, various nonstate actors have been granted
particular roles in lawmaking processes. For instance, the International Labor
Organization has adopted a formal tripartite model in which each member state
is represented by two government delegates, one employer delegate, and one
worker delegate, thereby creating a role for nonstate actors.27 Representatives
of indigenous peoples were involved in the drafting of the 1994 United Nations
Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.2 8 NGOs are allowed to
play a formal role in some international judicial proceedings, 2 9 and they have
played an informal though critical role in campaigning for and then influencing
the drafting of certain treaties. 30 The International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC), for example, has been particularly influential in the area of
international humanitarian law.3 1
W. INT'L L.J. 241, 241-50 (2001) (arguing for a limited reading of the Reparation for Injuries Advisory
Opinion), with Robert McCorquodale, The Individual and the International Legal System, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW 307, 309-10 (Malcolm D. Evans ed., 2d ed. 2006) (proposing a broad reading of
the Reparation for Injuries Advisory Opinion).
25. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 3, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331
[hereinafter VCLT].
26. See, e.g., Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co. v. Libya, 53 I.L.R. 422, 473-74, 1 66 (opinion of
Ren6-Jean Dupuy); LAUTERPACHT, supra note 15, at 147; Derek W. Bowett, Claims Between States and
Private Entities: The Twilight Zone ofInternational Law, 35 CATH. U. L. REv. 929 (1986).
27. See Isabelle R. Gunning, Modernizing Customary International Law: The Challenge of
Human Rights, 31 VA. J. INT'L L. 211, 232-33 (1991); How the ILO Works, INT'L LABOR ORG.,
http://www.ilo.org/global/AbouttheILO/Structure/lang--en/index.htm (last visited Nov. 2, 2011).
28. ALAN BOYLE & CHRISTINE CHINKIN, THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 48-49
(2007); Robert McCorquodale, An Inclusive International Legal System, 17 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 477, 479-
80,493 (2004).
29. See, e.g., Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the
Establishment of an African Court of Human and Peoples' Rights art. 5(3), June 9, 1998, O.A.U. Doc.
CAB/LEG/665, available at http://www.achpr.org/english/ info/court en.html (permitting NGOs with
observer status to initiate cases); Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, supra note 17, arts. 34, 36(2) (permitting NGO applications where the NGO was a victim and
NGO interventions otherwise by permission); Methanex Corp. v. United States, Decision of the Tribunal
on Petitions by Third Persons to Intervene as "Amici Curiae," at DI, Dl 2 (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib.
Jan. 15, 2001), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/6039.pdf (permitting NGO
interventions); Practice Directions, INT'L COURT OF JUSTICE, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/
documents/index.php?pl=4&p2=4&p3=0 (last visited Nov. 2, 2011) (permitting NGO interventions in
advisory requests but not contentious disputes under Article XII). On the role that NGOs have played in
international judicial proceedings, see generally Lance Bartholomeusz, The Amicus Curiae Before
International Courts and Tribunals, in 5 NONSTATE ACTORS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 209 (2005);
and Dinah Shelton, The Participation of Nongovernmental Organizations in International Judicial
Proceedings, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 611 (1994).
30. See BOYLE & CHINKIN, supra note 28, at 54-57, 62-77; Kenneth Anderson, The Ottawa
Convention Banning Landmines, the Role of International Non-Governmental Organizations and the
Idea ofInternational Civil Society, 11 EUR. J. INT'L L. 91, 110-19 (2000); Mahnoush H. Arsanjani, The
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 22, 23-39 (1999); Steve
Chamovitz, Nongovernmental Organizations and International Law, 100 AM. J. INT'L L. 348, 352-53
(2006).
31. For example, the ICRC convened meetings of experts in advance of the diplomatic
conferences of 1949 and 1974-77 that adopted the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols, and
Lawmaking by Nonstate Actors
On the whole, however, the notion of international lawmaking embodied
in the doctrine of sources has remained remarkably statist in character.
According to mainstream theories, nonstate entities may enjoy rights,
obligations, and enforcement capacities under international law, but only if, and
to the extent that, those rights, obligations, and capacities are created or
recognized by states. 32
B. Moving Beyond Statism: From Dualism to Tripartism
We contend that, in analyzing the potential for nonstate entities to engage
in lawmaking, it is necessary to move past the state/nonstate dichotomy and
adopt a tripartite distinction between states, state-empowered bodies, and
nonstate actors. The dualist state/nonstate distinction has been criticized for
defining all nonstate entities by reference to what they are not. This negative
distinction thereby reinforces the idea that states are the primary or only
subjects of international law and obscures differences between different types
of nonstate entities.33 While we challenge the notion that states are the only
subjects of international law, we do not dispute their continuing centrality. 34
Nonetheless, we believe that there are important reasons to distinguish between
state-empowered bodies and nonstate actors that tend to be lost in debates that
begin with the state/nonstate framework.35
1. States
Whether an entity qualifies as a state generally depends on whether it
possesses a permanent population, a defined territory, a government, and
36
capacity to enter into relations with other states, or is recognized as a state by
other states. While the lawmaking power of states is not disputed, debate exists
over the potential for entities that display many of the characteristics of states
(such as Palestine, Taiwan, and the Holy See) to engage in law creation.37
submitted drafts of the Conventions and Protocols to the diplomatic conferences. The ICRC has since
been instrumental in the drafting and adoption of numerous other treaties, including the Ottawa
Convention and the Rome Statute for the ICC. The customary international humanitarian law study
concluded under the auspices of the ICRC is proving highly influential as demonstrated by citations in
judgments of international and national courts and tribunals. The ICRC has also been granted observer
status before the General Assembly in recognition of the mandates conferred upon it by the Geneva
Conventions and its special role "in international humanitarian relations." G.A. Res. 45/6, 1 2, U.N. Doe.
A/RES/45/6 (Oct. 16, 1990).
32. PARLETT, supra note 18, at 324-25.
33. Philip Alston, The "Not-a-Cat" Syndrome: Can the International Human Rights Regime
Accommodate Non-State Actors?, in NON-STATE ACTORS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 3, 3-4 (Philip Alston
ed., 2005); Susan Marks, State-Centrism, International Law, and the Anxieties ofInfluence, 19 LEIDEN
J. INT'L L. 339, 340-41 (2006).
34. HIGGINS, supra note 21, at 39 (arguing for recognition of a broader array of participants in
the international legal process but acknowledging that "states are, at this moment of history, still at the
heart of the international legal system").
35. This distinction is not intended to suggest that all entities within a single category are
equivalent, nor is the dividing line between these categories always easy to discern.
36. Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933, 49 Stat. 3097, 165 L.N.T.S.
19. Other requirements may also exist. See JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 48-74 (2006).
37. These entities include some whose statehood is contested (e.g., Palestine and Taiwan) and
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2. State-Empowered Bodies
We define "state-empowered bodies" as international bodies created by
two or more states and granted authority to make decisions or take actions, such
as developing, interpreting, applying, and enforcing international law.38 The
creation of state-empowered bodies by states distinguishes them from pure
nonstate actors such as individuals, corporations, NGOs, and armed groups. 3 9
State-empowered bodies include entities made up of all or most states (such as
the General Assembly), entities made up of sub-groups of states (such as the
Security Council), and entities whose members are appointed by states (such as
the ICJ, the ILC, and the Human Rights Committee).4 0 This Article treats state-
empowered bodies as a distinct category from nonstate actors for descriptive
and normative reasons.
Descriptively, it is becoming increasingly well-accepted that many state-
empowered bodies play direct and indirect roles in the formation of
international law, though their means of doing so do not fit neatly within the
framework of Article 38(1) of the ICJ Statute. 4 1 For example: the Security
Council is empowered to impose binding decisions on all member states of the
United Nations;42 international organizations can enter into treaties with states
others that are neither states nor aspiring states but which enjoy many of the rights and obligations
accorded to states (e.g., the Holy See and the Sovereign Order of Malta). Some of these entities enter
into international agreements with states, unilaterally declare themselves bound by certain international
rules, and benefit from observer status at international organizations and conferences.
38. This definition draws on contemporary debates about the delegation of powers from states
to international organizations and other entities. See Curtis A. Bradley & Judith G. Kelley, The Concept
oflnternational Delegation, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 3-9 (2008) (adopting a similar definition of
international delegation, but not limiting it to bodies created by states).
39. State-empowered bodies include but are not limited to international organizations, which
are generally defined as having been established (1) by an international agreement between states, (2)
with at least one organ distinct from its member states and capable of so acting, and (3) under
international law. Jost E. ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS As LAW-MAKERS 6 (2005);
HENRY G. SCHERMERS & NIELS M. BLOKKER, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL LAW: UNITY WITHIN
DIVERSITY 26-39 (4th rev. ed. 2003).
40. States can delegate powers directly to a state-empowered body, or indirectly, if one state-
empowered body redelegates power to another such body. ALVAREZ, supra note 39, at 5-6; DAN
SAROOSHI, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND THEIR EXERCISE OF SOVEREIGN POWERS 18-27
(2005). For example, states delegated powers to the General Assembly and the Security Council, which
in turn created and redelegated powers to the ILC and ICTY, respectively. For the basis of this power of
redelegation, see U.N. Charter arts. 13, 39, 41. On the legitimacy of such redelegations based on the
U.N. Charter, see Prosecutor v. Tadid, Case No. IT-94-1-1, 14-22 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995).
41. See generally ALVAREZ, supra note 39, at 13-14 (describing how international
organizations undertake "legislative acts," producing "rules," "norms," "standards," and "laws"); id. at
595-97 (explaining that international organization standard-setting often does not fit into any of the three
established sources of law); Jonathan I. Chamey, Universal International Law, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 529
(1993) (noting the emergence of universally binding international law based on actions by states in
multilateral fora); Jan Klabbers, International Organizations in the Formation of Customary
International Law, in CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW ON THE USE OF FORCE: A METHODOLOGICAL
APPROACH 179 (Enzo Cannizzaro & Paolo Palchetti eds., 2005) (considering the potential for the
practice of international organizations to contribute to the formation of customary international law); Jan
Klabbers, Lawmaking and Constitutionalism, in THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 81, 85-99 (Jan Klabbers, Anne Peters & Geir Ulfstein eds., 2009) (outlining a variety of challenges
to the statist approach to the doctrine of sources as well as attempts to retheorize the doctrine in light of
these challenges).
42. U.N. Charter art. 25. See generally ALVAREZ, supra note 39, at 184-98 ("The Security
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and each other;43 judicial decisions of international courts and tribunals play an
important role in creating and developing international law;44 and bodies such
as the ILC and Human Rights Committee influence the development and
interpretation of international law.45
Normatively, state-empowered bodies are created and empowered by
states, which creates a basis for arguing that any lawmaking powers exercised
by such bodies are derived from state consent.46 In addition, after an initial
delegation of lawmaking powers has been made, states retain a variety of
formal and informal powers to sanction state-empowered bodies if they
overreach in their lawmaking efforts.4 7 This means that states can affirm,
acquiesce in, or reject particular lawmaking attempts by state-empowered
bodies. For example, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia radically transformed the content of the law of noninternational
armed conflict in Prosecutor v. Tadi648 when it held that many of the rules of
the law of international armed conflict were also applicable to nonintemational
armed conflicts. States then affirmed that view when they adopted the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court.49 By contrast, the United Kingdom,
the United States, and France objected to the Human Rights Committee's
General Comment on the impact of reservations that were incompatible with
the object and purpose of human rights treaties,50 resulting in uncertainty over
the correct approach to be taken to reservations to human rights treaties. Any
role that state-empowered bodies play in law creation is thus dependent on
Council as Law-maker"); id. at 416-24 (describing the Security Council's role as a "non-judicial actor"
in dispute settlement within the U.N); BOYLE & CHINKIN, supra note 28, at 109-15. For a specific
example, see Paul C. Szasz, The Security Council Starts Legislating, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 901, 902 (2006).
43. VCLT-IO, supra note 23, at 63-64.
44. See ALVAREZ, supra note 39, at 458-65, 545-84; BOYLE & CHINKIN, supra note 28, at
263-312; HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT (1982).
45. See Statute of the International Law Commission, G.A. Res. 174(11), U.N. Doc.
A/RES/174(l1) (Nov. 21, 1947) (as amended). See generally ALVAREZ, supra note 39, at 304-16
(discussing the influence of the ILC's "expert" treaty-making); BOYLE & CHINKIN, supra note 28, at
154-57 (discussing the influence of the Human Rights Committee); id. at 171-204 (discussing the
history, significance, and limitations of the ILC's contribution to the development of international law,
and its effect on customary international law).
46. Bradley & Kelley, supra note 38, at 3-12. This approach leaves open many questions,
including what powers are delegated to these bodies, whether they are acting within their delegated
authority, and whether and to what extent such authority may change over time as a result of actions of
the body coupled with acquiescence on the part of states.
47. For discussions about powers to sanction state-empowered bodies in relation to
international courts and tribunals, see, for example, Jacob Katz Cogan, Competition and Control in
International Adjudication, 48 VA. J. INT'L L. 411 (2008); Tom Ginsburg, Bounded Discretion in
International Judicial Lawmaking, 45 VA. J. INT'L L. 631 (2005); and Anthea Roberts, Power and
Persuasion in Investment Treaty Interpretation. The Dual Role of States, 104 AM. J. INT'L L. 179, 185-
95 (2010).
48. Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction,
l 119 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995).
49. See Danner, supra note 3, at 25-37; Kress, supra note 3, at 107.
50. Compare U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 24 (52), U.N. Doe.
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6 (Nov. I1, 1994), with Rep. of the Human Rights Comm., Observations on
General Comment No. 24 (52), at 131, 135, U.N. Doc. A/50/40 (Oct. 31, 1995) (statements of the
United States and the United Kingdom), and Rep. of the Human Rights Comm., at 117, U.N. Doc.
A/51/40 (Sept. 16, 1996) (statement of France).
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initial state consent and at least some level of ongoing state consent.
3. Nonstate Actors
Under this tripartite framework, "nonstate actors" are neither states nor
state-empowered bodies. They include individuals, corporations, NGOs, and
armed groups. Although coherent in one sense, this category is defined by
reference to what it is not. It thus contains a disparate collection of actors,
which complicates analysis about their actual and appropriate lawmaking role.
Descriptively, this category enjoys the weakest claim to lawmaking status
under international law as there is no general agreement that such actors play a
role in law creation, even with respect to those laws that are binding upon
them.5 Normatively, it is difficult to justify a law-creating role for nonstate
actors as a group using traditional arguments based on state consent because
they are neither states (with direct lawmaking powers) nor entities that are
created and empowered by states (with delegated lawmaking powers). It should
come as no surprise, then, that discussions about nonstate entities playing an
actual or potential role in the creation of international law usually focus on the
role of state-empowered bodies rather than nonstate actors.52
C. Recognizing a Law-Creating Role for Nonstate Actors
When scholars do grapple with the question of a role for nonstate actors
in international law creation, a broad spectrum of views emerges. Andrew
Clapham and Robert McCorquodale, both strong proponents of challenging the
statist approach to the subjects of international law, typify opposing poles of
thought regarding giving nonstate actors a role in law creation.
At one end of the spectrum, Clapham argues for the recognition of rights
and obligations of nonstate actors as well as increased opportunities for
enforcement, but does not contend that nonstate actors have or should have a
role in law creation.5 3 He argues that one can "recognize the importance of
nonstate actors and their influence without suggesting that they have achieved
the role of law-maker." 54 Nonstate actors are subjects of international law in the
sense of having rights, duties, and capacities, but international law remains
"mostly generated by accepted processes between states."55 This approach has
the advantage, he contends, of maintaining the core structures of international
law and not "inappropriately legitimizing the relevant non-state actors."56
51. See supra Part 1. In some cases, nonstate actors might not have an interest in lobbying for
recognition as a general subject of intemational law because they do not wish to attract general
obligations under international law. For example, transnational corporations have not argued for general
international legal personality, preferring to secure specific substantive and enforcement rights in limited
circumstances (such as in the realm of foreign investment) without exposing themselves to international
obligations more generally. A. Claire Cutler, Critical Reflections on the Westphalian Assumptions of
International Law and Organization: A Crisis ofLegitimacy, 27 REV. INT'L L. STUD. 133, 143 (2001).
52. See, for example, the approaches of modern positivists discussed supra Part II.A.
53. ANDREw CLAPHAM, HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS OF NON-STATE ACTORS 28-29 (2006).
54. Id. at 28.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 29.
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At the other end of the spectrum, McCorquodale argues for a broader
definition of subjecthood that would include lawmaking capacities as an
essential element.5 7 "A 'subject' of the international legal system," he argues,
"can be considered to be one which has direct rights and responsibilities under
that system, can bring international claims and . . . is able to participate in the
creation, development, and enforcement of international law." This leads
McCorquodale to argue for an "inclusive international legal system" based on
the idea of participation rather than subjecthood, in which a myriad of nonstate
actors would participate in law creation whether directly or indirectly. 8 "The
participation of non state actors . . . may not be the traditional method of
international lawmaking," he concludes, "but it is now an accepted method."S9
Clapham's statist approach to law creation would preclude armed groups
from playing any role in making international law, even with respect to norms
that are binding upon them. 60 McCorquodale's inclusive approach to law
creation, by contrast, represents a potentially significant challenge to the
traditional paradigm of sources and lawmaking. It would create a basis for
recognizing a lawmaking role of armed groups alongside many other nonstate
actors. Nonetheless, he leaves unanswered many important questions regarding
the modalities of law creation by nonstate actors, including what is meant by
"participation" and whether it is intended to be direct (which would be
relatively radical) or indirect (which would be comparatively
uncontroversial).61
We argue that it is possible to eschew the extremes of statism and full
inclusivity to find various mid way rationales enabling certain nonstate actors,
but not others, to play a recognized role in law creation. Below, we identify
four intermediate approaches that justify the participation of particular types of
nonstate actors in lawmaking processes. Since we believe that different
rationales might be appropriate when dealing with different types of nonstate
actors, our aim is to provide a schema for understanding a range of more
moderate positions. Instead of endorsing a one-size-fits-all approach that would
apply to all nonstate actors, these intermediate stances provide a useful way of
assessing the lawmaking potential of a variety of nonstate actors, including
57. McCorquodale, supra note 28, at 479-80; McCorquodale, supra note 24, at 307.
58. McCorquodale, supra note 28, at 492-97.
59. Id. at 496.
60. More recently, Clapham has indicated greater sympathy toward the view that armed
groups might play some role in the formation of international humanitarian law norms. See ANDREW
CLAPHAM, THE RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF ARMED NONSTATE ACTORS: THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE
AND ISSUES SURROUNDING ENGAGEMENT 41-44 (2010) (recognizing that the involvement of armed
groups in the law creation process may prove a "new direction" in engagement with armed groups, as
well as fostering a sense of ownership by them over international humanitarian norms, but cautioning
against collapsing the normative legal regime into a description of existing canons of behavior by all
relevant actors).
61. Other unanswered questions include: Should all nonstate actors be granted a role in law
creation or only those with rights and obligations? Have the views of such actors already been accounted
for through their domestic relationship with their home state? How might the views and practices of
nonstate actors be evidenced? And how should the views and practices of different nonstate actors be
weighed against each other and those of states and state-empowered bodies? To the extent that
McCorquodale argues simply for an indirect role of nonstate actors in law creation, his position is not
that far removed from Clapham's approach.
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armed groups.
1. State Consent
A lawmaking role for certain nonstate actors could be recognized based
on express or implied state consent. States could expressly agree that certain
nonstate actors could play a role in treaty negotiations or unilaterally undertake
to be bound by particular treaty commitments. Where a state enters into a
bilateral agreement with a nonstate actor, such as an armed group, it is arguably
impliedly consenting to that actor having some role in law creation, at least for
the limited purpose of entering into and being bound by that agreement. Just as
states can confer rights, obligations, and enforcement capacities on nonstate
actors, so too are they able to confer discrete lawmaking roles on nonstate
actors. This represents a limited departure from the traditional, state-centered
approach to law creation as it remains tied to state action and state consent. It
also parallels the way state-empowered bodies acquire a recognized role in law
creation, which is based, to a large extent, on the notion of delegated
lawmaking powers.
2. State-Like Entities
An exception to the purely statist approach to the doctrine of sources
could be recognized for "state-like" entities that share many of the
characteristics of states, such as territory, population, and government, but are
not recognized as states. This approach accepts that states remain the principal
actors in the international legal system, but argues for a more flexible
delimitation of states as opposed to nonstates for the purposes of law-creation.
A number of developments in international law already evidence this approach.
States and international organizations have traditionally conferred some
legal status upon representatives of peoples that are recognized as having a
right to self-determination.62 For example: the General Assembly granted the
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) observer status at the General
Assembly;63 some argue that international agreements entered into between
Israel and the PLO constitute treaties; 64 and Palestine has been permitted to
participate in Security Council debates and proceedings before the ICJ, both of
which have traditionally been limited to participation by states. Entities
62. Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV),
U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, U.N. Doc. A/RES/25/2625, Annex (Oct. 24, 1970); BROWNLIE,
supra note 4, at 62-63.
63. G.A. Res. 3237 (XXIX), U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (Nov.
22, 1974).
64. See, e.g., GEOFFREY R. WATSON, THE OSLO ACCORDS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE
ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN PEACE AGREEMENTS 57-74 (2000); Peter Malanczuk, Some Basic Aspects of the
Agreements Between Israel and the PLO from the Perspective of International Law, 7 EUR. J. INT'L L.
485, 488-92 (1996); John Quigley, The Israel-PLO Interim Agreements: Are They Treaties?, 30
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 717, 740 (1997). But see Katherine W. Meighan, Note, The Israel-PLO Declaration
of Principles: Prelude to a Peace?, 34 VA. J. INT'L L. 435, 452 (1994).
65. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
2003 I.C.J. 428, 429 (Dec. 19); U.N. SCOR, 44th Sess., 2841st mtg. at 3-7, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2841 (Jan.
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recognized as belligerents have also traditionally been afforded the capacity to
enter into legal relations and conclude international agreements. 6 More
generally, states have signed peace agreements with armed groups that exercise
control over territory. Such groups have also signed agreements with each
other. These agreements are often characterized as treaties and some have
become important steps in the recognition of new states, as occurred in the
former Yugoslavia.67
On one level, this approach may represent a relatively minor conceptual
departure from the traditional state-centered approach as it accepts sovereign
entities as the only lawmaking entities but broadens our understanding of that
category. In practice, however, it would likely be highly controversial because
states often deny that these entities are states, and thus are unlikely to accept a
formal law-creating role for them despite their state-like nature or functions. If
this approach were accepted, it would pave the way for recognition of the
lawmaking capacity of certain armed groups but not others. It would privilege
those with a strong claim to state-like status because of territorial control or the
exercise of governmental functions. It might also create a risk of incentivizing
armed groups to use violent means in order to gain state-like qualities so as to
be granted a role in lawmaking.
3. Bearers ofRights or Obligations
A more fundamental challenge to the statist doctrine of sources would be
to decouple lawmaking capacity from statehood and to re-found it on the
concept of bearing rights or obligations under international law. For instance,
Anthony Clark Arend links the role of states in law creation to the traditional
understanding that international law governs the actions of states and thus
should be based on their consent.68 In light of the rise of international rules
binding various state-empowered bodies and nonstate actors, he questions
11, 1989).
66. Gerald Fitzmaurice, for example, explained that treaty-making capacity extends to "para-
Statal entities recognized as possessing a definite if limited form of international personality, for
example, insurgent communities recognized as having belligerent status-de facto authorities in control
of specific territory." Special Rapporteur, Documents of the Tenth Session Including the Rep. of the
Comm'n to the Gen. Assembly: Law of Treaties, art. 8, T 2, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/115 (Mar. 18, 1958) (by
G.G. Fitzmaurize); see BROWNLIE, supra note 4, at 63.
67. During the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia, various sub-state entities entered into
peace agreements with each other. These agreements were generally characterized as treaties and helped
lead to the recognition of new states such as Bosnia and Herzegovina. For example, the Dayton Accords
included a General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina along with Annexes
and an Agreement on Initialing. The General Framework was concluded by the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The Annexes were
mainly concluded between the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and two entities involved in the
conflict, the Republika of Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The negotiators took
for granted that the Republika of Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina could conclude
the agreements, though they were not recognized as states and the entities effectively signed away their
legal personality in doing so, as they accepted a new Constitution of the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina in which their entities became members as a federal state. See Christine Bell, Peace
Agreements: Their Nature and Legal Status, 100 AM. J. INT'L L. 373, 380 (2006); Paola Gaeta, The
Dayton Agreements and International Law, 7 EUR. J. INT'L L. 147, 158-60 (1996).
68. ANTHONY CLARK AREND, LEGAL RULES AND INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 43 (1999).
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whether these actors should play a role in creating such rules.6 Similar
arguments have been or could be made with respect to specific categories of
nonstate actors, such as individuals and nonstate armed groups.70 For example,
Christiana Ochoa argues that, as individuals now bear rights and obligations
under international law, the process by which custom is formed should be
broadened to include their voices, as custom receives its legitimacy from the
fact that it "originate[s] in the actions and beliefs of those whom it later comes
to bind - the subjects of [international] law."71
A variation of this argument is that nonstate actors should be able to play
a role in lawmaking, but only with respect to obligations that are or may
become binding upon them. Jan Klabbers argues, for instance, that creating
rights for nonstate actors requires no special justification, but imposing
"obligations directly on non-state actors . . . require[s] a justification of sorts, if
only for the sake of legitimacy."72 If nonstate armed groups are bound by
international humanitarian law, he asks, should they not play some role in
determining the existence and content of their obligations?73 This argument has
some resonance with the different ways in which third-party rights and
obligations are treated under treaty law, where consent of the third-party is
usually presumed for third-party rights but required for third-party
obligations. 74 It also has some parallels with certain roles granted to state-
empowered bodies. For instance, the ILC is now drafting articles on the
responsibility of international organizations and, as part of this process, is
considering submissions from states and international organizations.7 5
69. Id.
70. Some have suggested granting individuals a right to participate in lawmaking through
creation of a directly elected world parliament. See, e.g., THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS 483 (1995); Richard Falk & Andrew Strauss, On the Creation
of a Global Peoples Assembly: Legitimacy and the Power of Popular Sovereignty, 36 STAN. J. INT'L L.
191 (2000).
71. Christiana Ochoa, The Individual and Customary International Law Formation, 48 VA. J.
INT'L L. 119, 122 (2007).
72. Jan Klabbers, (I Can't Get No) Recognition: Subjects Doctrine and the Emergence ofNon-
State Actors, in NORDIC COSMOPOLITANISM: ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR MARTII
KOSKENNIEMI 351, 354-55 (Jama Petman & Jan Klabbers eds., 2003).
73. Id. at 357-61; see also Marco Sassbli, Taking Armed Groups Seriously: Ways To Improve
Their Compliance with International Humanitarian Law, I J. INT'L HUM. L. STUD. 5 (2010) (arguing
that the perspectives of nonstate actors should influence international humanitarian law and suggesting
ways in which nonstate actors could contribute to the formulation and operation of the law).
74. VCLT, supra note 25, arts. 34-36.
75. The ILC has received comments from the European Commission, International Atomic
Energy Agency, International Criminal Police Organization, International Maritime Organization,
International Monetary Fund, International Seabed Authority, Multinational Force and Observers,
Organization of American States, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, United
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, United Nations Development Program,
United Nations Secretariat, World Bank, World Health Organization, World Intellectual Property
Organization and the World Trade Organization. For examples of comments from these groups, see Rep.
of the Int'l Law Comm'n, 61st sess, May 4-June 5, July 6-Aug. 7, 2009, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/609; Rep. of
the Int'l Law Comm'n, 60th sess, May 5-June 6, July 7-Aug. 8, 2008, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/593; Rep. of
the Int'l Law Comm'n, 60th sess, May 5-June 6, July 7-Aug. 8, 2008, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/593/Add.1;
Rep. of the Int'l Law Comm'n, 59th sess, May 7-June 8, July 9-Aug. 10, 2007, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/582;
Rep. of the Int'l Law Comm'n, 58th sess, May 1-June 9, July 3-Aug. 11, 2006, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/568;
Rep. of the Int'l Law Comm'n, 58th sess, May I-June 9, July 3-Aug. 11, 2006, U.N. Doc.
A/CN/568/Add.1; Rep. of the Int'l Law Comm'n, 57th sess, May 2-June 3, July 4-Aug. 5, 2005, U.N.
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This approach represents a significant departure from the statist approach
to the doctrine of sources, as lawmaking capacity would be tied to whether an
entity bears rights or obligations under international law. If adopted, this theory
would justify armed groups' playing a role in law creation, at least with respect
to international humanitarian law. It would map more accurately certain
realities, such as the extensive use of humanitarian law agreements between
states and armed groups, regardless of whether the latter are state-like. The
theory would also pave the way for many other nonstate actors to play a role in
law creation. Nonetheless, it would not provide a strong basis for entities such
as NGOs to claim lawmaking status, given that they are primarily concerned
with lobbying for rights and obligations of actors other than themselves. In this
way, this approach represents a step short of the completely inclusive approach,
just as the state-like approach represents a step short of the purely statist
approach.
Yet the focus on rights and obligations also suffers from practical and
conceptual problems. On a practical level, it is difficult to envisage how a role
in law creation for nonstate actors would work. For example, which nonstate
actors would take part in treaty negotiations and according to what criteria?76
And would making obligations on nonstate actors contingent upon their consent
result in the downgrading of international law standards? On a conceptual level,
might international law limit lawmaking capacity to states on the basis that they
are presumed to represent the interests of their nationals and those within their
territory, including persons who are subject to rights and obligations under
international humanitarian law, international criminal law, and international
human rights law? To some extent, this notion of representation has always
been a fiction, as states may engage in lawmaking on the international plane
regardless of their democratic or non-democratic nature and the domestic
voices they exclude or underrepresent in doing so. But this fiction is
particularly difficult to maintain when the interests of states and certain
nonstate actors systematically diverge, as is the case with states and armed
groups. The next approach addresses this challenge.
4. Excluded Voices
Instead of granting nonstate actors a role in lawmaking in all
circumstances in which their rights or obligations are at issue, a fourth
approach would be to recognize a lawmaking role for those actors whose views
are not represented (well or at all) by states. For example, there may be
situations where the interests of governments and their populations
systematically diverge. This could form a basis for arguing that these
individuals should play a role in law creation with respect to their rights and
obligations. Much of international human rights law might come under this
rationale, as one of its primary purposes is to protect individuals from the
Doc. A/CN.4/556; and Rep. of the Int'l Law Comm'n, 56th sess, May 3-June 4, July 5-Aug. 6, 2004,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/545.
76. Ochoa struggles with the same question with respect to including the views and practices
of individuals in the formulation of customary international law. Ochoa, supra note 71, at 176-84.
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actions of their government.77
States are unlikely to represent the views of armed groups operating
within their territory, since those groups are frequently fighting against, and
challenging the legitimacy of, their governments. According to Klabbers, "to
argue that non-state entities are by definition represented by their governments
is implausible where the very raison d'dtre of those nonstate entities is to deny
the representative nature of their governments." 78 In addition to states having
an acute interest in not representing the views of armed groups fighting against
them, other states may have a general interest in not recognizing such views
due to a desire not to create a precedent that may work against them in the
future.
The excluded-voices approach may also form the basis for recognizing a
lawmaking role for NGOs on the basis that they lobby for the interests of those
who are either excluded from or undervalued in the traditional statist paradigm.
Isabelle Gunning, for example, argues that NGOs should have a legal voice in
the creation of custom because they are able to represent neglected
perspectives, such as the importance of the human rights of women.79 Others,
such as Julie Mertus and Kenneth Anderson, caution against granting NGOs a
direct role in lawmaking given that the claim that NGOs serve as proxies for
civil society is open to question and raises concerns about democratic
legitimacy.80
Adopting the excluded voices approach would represent a significant
challenge to the traditional statist approach to the doctrine of sources, although
it is more moderate than giving all nonstate actors with rights or obligations a
role in law creation. The key would be to identify categories of nonstate actors
that have rights or obligations under international law and whose views are
systematically unrepresented by states. The approach would be almost the
antithesis of one based on state consent. It also faces significant practical and
conceptual difficulties. Which nonstate actors would be given a role in law
creation and how would that role be given effect? Who would decide whether
certain excluded voices should be given a role in the lawmaking process, given
that states are likely to object to giving a role to nonstate actors they view as
illegitimate?1 And would this approach result in international law standards
77. Id. at 158-62. Thus, by analogy, the U.N. Human Rights Committee found that states
cannot withdraw unilaterally from the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights because the
rights enshrined therein belong to the people living in the state and cannot be abrogated by the
government of that state. Rep. of the Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 26, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.8/Rev.1 (Dec. 8, 1997).
78. Klabbers, supra note 72, at 359; see also Sass6li, supra note 73, at 7-8 ("[Armed groups]
would not be . . . engaged in an armed conflict . . . if they were within the practical reach of the law of
the land and the law enforcement systems of the State on whose territory they are fighting . . .
79. Gunning, supra note 27, at 227-34.
80. Julie Mertus, Considering Nonstate Actors in the New Millennium: Toward Expanded
Participation in Norm Generation and Norm Application, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 537, 561-62
(2000); see also Anderson, supra note 30, at 110-19 (arguing that NGOs are not directly connected to
masses of people and therefore are not authentic voices of democracy).
81. States involved in noninternational armed conflicts are unlikely to accept that the armed
groups against which they are fighting are underrepresented or denied an effective voice. This mirrors
the special status given to wars of national liberation under Additional Protocol 1, which has gone
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being undermined?
D. The Needs of the International Community
The intermediate positions discussed above provide a schema for
justifying the inclusion of different types of nonstate actors in the creation of
international law. Each theory supports a role for at least certain types of armed
groups in the creation of at least some types of international law. We do not
endorse any overarching theory in the abstract, however. None of the theories is
necessary; other theories or combinations of theories might be appropriate
when dealing with different types of nonstate actors. Nor is any one of the
theories sufficient, as we contend that whether a particular type of nonstate
actor should be granted a role in law creation, and what the nature of that role
should be, must be conditioned on and shaped by the needs and interests of the
international community as a whole.
Our approach builds on the functional and incremental approach adopted
by the ICJ in its Reparation for Injuries Advisory Opinion.82 In finding that the
United Nations was a subject of international law, the Court clarified that "[t]he
subjects of law in any legal system are not necessarily identical in their nature
or in the extent of their rights, and their nature depends on the needs of their
community."83 Although the United Nations possessed a large measure of
"international personality and the capacity to operate on an international
plane," that did not mean that it was a state or that its "legal personality and
rights and duties [were] the same as those of a State." 84
On this basis, we argue that recognizing a law-creating role for some
nonstate actors does not mean granting them the same lawmaking powers as
states. Instead, in assessing whether to grant particular nonstate actors a role in
law creation, and in tailoring the nature of that role to fit the type of actor in
question, we must examine the needs of the international community as a
whole. Although difficult to identify and define, the interests of the
international community are clearly broader than those of states alone and
include the interests of nonstate actors (such as NGOs, armed groups, and
civilians) and state-empowered bodies.85
virtually unused in that context because no state is willing to accept that it is involved in such a conflict.
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 1) art. 96(3), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3
[hereinafter Additional Protocol 1].
82. Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion,
1949 I.C.J. 174 (Apr. I1).
83. Id. at 178 (emphasis added).
84. Id. at 179.
85. Unlike the VCLT, we do not define the "international community" as limited to the
"international community of States as a whole." See VCLT, supra note 25, at 344. On the interests of the
international community, see Bruno Simma, From Bilateralism to Community Interest in International
Law, 250 RECUEIL DES COURs 217, 229-35 (1994); Bruno Simma & Andreas L. Paulus, The
"International Community": Facing the Challenge of Globalization, 9 EUR. J. INT'L L. 266, 266-77
(1998); and J.H.H. Weiler, The Geology ofInternational Law-Governance, Democracy and Legitimacy,
64 ZAORV 547, 556 (2004). On the difficulties of defining the international community and its interests,
see Dino Kritsiotis, Imagining the International Community, 13 EUR. J. INT'L L. 961 (2002).
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III. ARMED GROUPS AND INTERNATIONAL LAWMAKING
Whereas Part II set out a tripartite division of states, state-empowered
bodies, and nonstate actors and outlined arguments for a potential lawmaking
role of nonstate actors in general, Part III considers one specific nonstate
actor-armed groups-and explores arguments for and against recognizing a
role for armed groups in the creation and development of international
humanitarian law applicable in noninternational armed conflict. We have
focused on armed groups because of the unique role that nonstate armed groups
play in noninternational armed conflicts as a party to the conflict, and because
armed groups have produced a wealth of unilateral declarations, ad hoc
agreements and codes of conduct relating to humanitarian norms that cannot be
understood within the traditional doctrine of sources.86
Our notion of "armed groups" is limited to those groups that are parties to
noninternational armed conflicts and meet the definitional requirement of
organization, such as the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia
(Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) (FARC) of Colombia, the
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) of Sri Lanka, and the Sudan People's
Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) of Sudan.87 Many terrorist groups
would fail to meet these criteria either because they lack the relevant
organizational requirements or because they are involved in random acts of
violence rather than being engaged in a conflict that meets the threshold
requirements of a noninternational armed conflict.
A. Potential Advantages
Arguments about the potential advantages of involving armed groups in
law creation usually stem from an assumption that permitting such participation
would increase recognition of and compliance with humanitarian law rules by
armed groups, or states, or both. No systematic studies have been conducted on
this issue, but qualitative evidence suggests that these potential advantages
should be treated seriously.
1. Effect on Participating Armed Groups
Giving armed groups a role in humanitarian lawmaking processes may
increase the likelihood of those armed groups recognizing and abiding by
86. See supra note 7.
87. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, supra note 1, art. 3
("Each Party to the conflict shall . . . ."); Prosecutor v. Haradinaj, Case No. IT-04-84-T, Trial Judgment,
29-34 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 3, 2008).
88. For example, the United Kingdom has stated, in the context of Additional Protocol I that,
"[i]t is the understanding of the United Kingdom that the term 'armed conflict' of itself and in its context
denotes a situation of a kind which is not constituted by the commission of ordinary crimes including
acts of terrorism whether concerted or in isolation." Ratification (with Declarations and Reservations),
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 2020 U.N.T.S. 76 (Jan. 28, 1998). By contrast,
the United States considers itself involved in an armed conflict against Al Qaeda. See, e.g., Speech,
Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep't of State, Remarks to the annual meeting of the Am.
Society of Int'l L. on the Obama Administration and International Law (Mar. 25, 2010), available at
http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/139119.htm. However, this position is itself contested.
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humanitarian law norms. 8 The International Council on Human Rights Policy
reports that its research and consultations suggest that where armed groups
commit themselves to written codes of conduct, this encourages them to respect
human rights. 90 Marco Sass6li reasons that "it is psychologically easier to have
[international humanitarian law norms] accepted and respected by persons who
were involved-or represented-in their development," since this involvement
promotes a sense of "ownership" over the norms.
In some cases, armed groups have given notice that they do not consider
themselves bound by, or will not comply with, particular rules because they did
not participate in the creation of such rules. For example, following an appeal
on the part of the ICRC, the National Liberation Front of Vietnam wrote to the
ICRC indicating that it did not consider itself bound by the Geneva
Conventions because it did not participate in their creation.92 Human Rights
Watch has likewise reported that certain Colombian armed groups have
informed it that "although they support humanitarian standards in theory, they
do not accept [Additional] Protocol II since it was not negotiated directly with
them."93 And the Frente Farabundo Marti para la Liberaci6n Nacional
(Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front) (FMLN) in El Salvador refused to
follow particular humanitarian law norms on the basis that "no agreement
exist[ed] between the parties." 94
In other cases, armed groups have sought to bind themselves by particular
humanitarian law rules and there is evidence to suggest that this has affected
their behavior. For example, Geneva Call, a Geneva-based organization
dedicated to engaging armed groups in respecting and adhering to humanitarian
norms, created a Deed of Commitment on anti-personnel mines that can be
signed by "armed non-state actors." The Deed largely parallels the
89. Gauthier de Beco, Compliance with International Humanitarian Law by Non-State Actors,
18 J. INT'L L. PEACE & ARMED CONFLICT 190, 193 (2005) ("One way of improving compliance with the
law of internal armed conflict is to give non-State actors the opportunity to conclude agreements with
their government and other armed groups, and undertake unilateral declarations of conduct."). See
generally INT'L COMM. RED CROSS, INCREASING RESPECT FOR INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
IN NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS (2008), available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/
other/icrc_002_0923.pdf (noting that the ICRC has worked to increase respect for international
humanitarian law during noninternational conflicts).
90. INT'L COUNCIL ON HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY, ENDS AND MEANS: HUMAN RIGHTS
APPROACHES TO ARMED GROUPS 52 (2000).
91. Marco Sassbli, Possible Legal Mechanisms To Improve Compliance by Armed Groups
with International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law 6 (Nov. 13, 2003)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.genevacall.org/resources/other-documents-studies/f-
other-documents-studies/2001-2010/2003-13nov-sassoli.pdf. On the idea of ownership of the laws of
war more generally, see Kenneth Anderson, Who Owns the Rules of War?, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Apr. 13,
2003, at 38, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/04/13/magazine/who-owns-the-rules-of-
war.html?.
92. Letter from Chef de la Representation Permanente du FLN du Sud-Vietnam en URSS to
Representative of the ICRC (Oct. 16, 1965) (on file with ICRC Archives); see Int'l Comm. of the Red
Cross, The International Committee and the Vietnam Conflict, 6 INT'L REv. RED CROSS 399, 400
(1966).
93. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WAR WITHOUT QUARTER: COLOMBIA AND INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW 25 (1998).
94. U.N. Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL), Second Rep. of the United Nations
Observer Mission in El Salvador, %1 64-65, U.N. Doc. A/46/658 (Nov. 15, 1991); LIESBETH ZEGVELD,
THE ACCOUNTABILITY OF ARMED OPPOSITION GROUPS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 17 (2002).
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commitments incumbent upon states parties to the Ottawa Convention on the
Prohibition of Anti-Personnel Mines. Numerous armed groups-forty-one at
the time of writing-from Burundi, India, Iran, Iraq, Myanmar, Philippines,
Somalia, Sudan, Turkey, and Western Sahara have signed the Deed, agreeing to
the "complete prohibition on all use, development, production, acquisition,
stockpiling, retention and transfer of [anti-personnel] mines, under any
circumstances." 95 Geneva Call has reported a decline in the use of anti-
personnel mines by signatories to the Deed and has facilitated the destruction of
numerous stockpiles of mines.96 Few allegations of use or acquisition of anti-
personnel mines have been made against signatories to the Deed, and of these,
only one was upheld following extemal verification.9 7 Many of the signatories
used anti-personnel mines before signing the Deed, suggesting that the Deed
has had some impact on their behavior.
Armed groups have also entered into agreements with international
organizations and states in which they accept certain humanitarian law
obligations. These, too, seem to have had a positive effect on compliance.
Examples include the Ground Rules concluded between various Sudanese
armed groups and the U.N. Operation Lifeline Sudan, and "action plans" on
child soldiers concluded between armed groups and U.N. entities.98 The action
plans commit the armed groups to the disarmament, demobilization, and
reintegration of child soldiers. As a result of these action plans, child soldiers
have been rehabilitated and reintegrated into society.99 The conclusion of the
action plans cannot be considered the sole cause of these improvements; in
addition, the Security Council has indicated that it may impose sanctions on
95. GENEVA CALL, DEED OF COMMITMENT UNDER GENEVA CALL FOR ADHERENCE TO A
TOTAL BAN ON ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES AND FOR COOPERATION IN MINE ACTION art. 1, available at
http://www.genevacall.org/resources/deed-of-commitment/f-deed-of-commitment/doc.pdf (last visited
Nov. 15, 2011) [hereinafter GENEVA CALL: DEED OF COMMITMENT]. For the list of signatories, see
Signatories to the Deed of Commitment Banning Anti-Personnel Mines, GENEVA CALL,
http://www.genevacall.org/resources/list-of-signatories/list-of-signatories.htm (last visited Dec. 2, 2011)
[hereinafter Signatories].
96. GENEVA CALL, ENGAGING ARMED NONSTATE ACTORS IN A LANDMINE BAN: THE
GENEVA CALL PROGRESS REPORT (2000-2007), at 16-17, 32 (2007), available at http://www.genevacall
.org/resources/research/f-research/2001-2010/gc-2007-progress-report.pdf [hereinafter GENEVA CALL:
PROGRESS REPORT]; see also U.N. Secretary-General, Rep. of the Secretary-General on the Protection
ofCivilians in Armed Conflict, 143, U.N. Doc. S/2009/277 (May 29, 2009) (reporting the cooperation in
anti-mine activities of the signatories to the Deed of Commitment).
97. See GENEVA CALL: PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 96, at 15-16.
98. See, e.g., ACTION PLAN BETWEEN THE MORO ISLAMIC LIBERATION FRONT (MILF) AND
THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES REGARDING THE ISSUE OF RECRUITMENT AND USE OF CHILD
SOLDIERS IN THE ARMED CONFLICT IN MINDANAO (2009), available at http://www.intemal-
displacement.org/8025708F004BE3Bl/(httpInfoFiles)/8AI24E947E0E67E5C12578BD00519B90/$file/
action-plan-milf-un-philippines-20-jan-2010.pdf; SOUTH SUDAN INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT/
OPERATION LIFELINE SUDAN AGREEMENT ON GROUND RULES (1995), available at
http://www.sudanarchive.net/cgi-bin/pagessoa?apdf&d=Dnld7.1.1&dl=1&sim=screen21mage; SUDAN
PEOPLES' LIBERATION MOVEMENT/OPERATION LIFELINE SUDAN AGREEMENT ON GROUND RULES
(1995), available at http://www.sudanarchive.net/cgi-bin/sudan?apdf&d-Dn ld7.3&dl=1.
99. Les Forces Armdes des Forces Nouvelles (FAFN) and other armed groups were de-listed
as a result of their conclusion of, and compliance with, an action plan. See Working Group of the
Security Council on Children and Armed Conflict, Annual Rep. on the Activities ofthe Security Council
Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict, July 1, 2007-June 30, 2008, f 16(a), U.N. Doc.
S/2008/455 (July 11, 2008).
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armed groups that make no action plans or that violate them. 00 Nonetheless,
the success of these action plans suggests a link between concluding an
agreement and complying with the provisions in that agreement.
2. Effect on States in Conflict with Armed Groups
Giving armed groups the ability to sign onto humanitarian law norms also
has the potential to improve compliance by the states they fight against. Certain
states have been hesitant to sign humanitarian law instruments because the
armed groups that they are fighting are unable to reciprocate. As a matter of
law, state ratification of a treaty would bind armed groups that are within the
state's territory but, as a matter of practice, some states have viewed ratification
as a one-sided act, effectively binding them without requiring a reciprocal
commitment from an armed group.'01 Allowing armed groups to demonstrate
formally their commitment to be bound, or to express their intention to comply
with existing legal obligations, could relieve some of the anxiety felt by these
states.
For instance, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A)
signed the Geneva Call Deed of Commitment in 2001;102 the SPLM/A and the
Government of Sudan signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the United
Nations on mine action in 2002; 103 and the Government ratified the Ottawa
Convention in 2003.104 According to the former director of the U.N. Mine
Action Service, "It is clear from conversations with senior officials of the
Government, that they would not have felt able to ratify the [Ottawa] Treaty, if
the SPLM/A had not already made a formal commitment to observe its
provisions in the territory under its control."',05 Here, the air of formality seems
to have helped because a previous commitment by the SPLM/A on mine action
had proved insufficient to induce the Government to ratify the Ottawa
Convention.106
The fact that the Deed largely parallels the Ottawa Convention helps in
creating the perception that the commitments of states and armed groups are
equal and complementary. Thus, the Government of Colombia has
100. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1882, 1 7(b), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1 882 (Aug. 4, 2009); S.C. Res. 1612, T
9, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1612 (July 26, 2005).
101. Sivakumaran, supra note 5, at 381-82.
102. See Signatories, supra note 95.
103. Memorandum of Understanding Regarding United Nations Mine Action Support to Sudan,
Sudan-Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement-U.N. (Sept. 19, 2002), available at http://ochaonline.un.org
/humanitariannegotiations/Documents/References/MOU-UN-Sudan-MineAction.pdf.
104. See Status: Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and
Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION,
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg-no=XXVI-5&chapter--26&lang
=en (last visited Dec. 10, 2011) [hereinafter Status: Anti-Personnel Mines].
105. Martin Barber, Preface to 1 GENEVA CALL, ARMED NONSTATE ACTORS AND LANDMINES:
A GLOBAL REPORT PROFILING NSAS AND THEIR USE, ACQUISITION, PRODUCTION, TRANSFER AND
STOCKPILING OF LANDMINES 1 (2005).
106. Resolution on Problem posed by Prolferation ofAnti-Personnel Mines in Liberated Parts
of New Sudan, SPLM/A (Nov. 1, 1996), in MINE BAN EDUCATION WORKSHOP IN SOUTHERN SUDAN:
REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 64 (2003), available at http://www.genevacall.org/
resources/conference-reports/f-conference-reports/2001-201 0/gc-2003-01 oct-sudan.pdf.
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acknowledged Geneva Call's engagement with the Ejdrcito de Liberaci6n
Nacional (National Liberation Army) (ELN) and has indicated that it is in favor
of "a process of engagement that is complementary and parallel to" the Ottawa
Convention. 107 Likewise, a European Parliament resolution on Sri Lanka "urges
both sides, as an immediate gesture of goodwill, to cease the use of [anti-
personnel] mines and to assist in their removal, and considers that, to this end,
the Government of Sri Lanka should set an example by signing the Ottawa
Convention and the LTTE should sign Geneva Call's Deed of Commitment." 08
Armed groups have also undertaken to comply with particular
humanitarian rules with the aim of affecting the behavior of the states against
which they are fighting. For example, on signing the Deed, the National
Council for the Defense of Democracy-Forces for the Defense of Democracy
(CNDD-FDD) "urged the government [of Burundi] to respect and quickly
implement its obligations under the [Mine Ban Treaty]."' 09 There are also
examples of armed groups that become or form part of a new government and
then continue their prior commitments to abide by particular norms. Thus, in
Iraq, two signatories to the Deed, the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, became part of the national authorities and
encouraged Iraq's accession to the Ottawa Convention, which occurred in
2007.110
3. Effect on Other Armed Groups
Allowing armed groups to agree to comply with humanitarian law norms
can also influence other armed groups to agree to comply with such norms,
either directly through peer pressure or indirectly through example setting.
Geneva Call incorporates this potential for influence into its strategy for
engagement. The Deed provides that signatories "see the desirability of
attracting the adherence of other armed groups to this Deed of Commitment and
107. GENEVA CALL, ANNUAL REPORT 19 (2003), available at http://www.genevacall.org/
resources/annual-reports/f-annual-reports/2001-201 0/gc-annual-report-2003.pdf.
108. European Parliament Resolution on the Situation in Sri Lanka, EUR. PARL. Doc. (0227)
12 (2006).
109. GENEVA CALL, supra note 107, at 9; see also Ndial Deng Nhial, Chairman, Sudan
People's Liberation Movement/Army Comm'n for External Relations, Info., and Humanitarian Affairs,
Statement of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army on the Occasion of the Signing and
Depositing to Geneva Call Deed of Commitment to Ban Landmines (Oct. 4, 2001), available at
http://www.genevacall.org/resources/nsas-statements/f-nsas-statements/2001-2010/2001-04oct-splma.
htm ("And as we stand committed to deposit our DEED OF COMMITMENT, we raise our voice to the
international community to bring pressure to bear on the government of the Sudan to ratify the Ottawa
Convention on the ban on the use of landmines .. . .").
110. See Signatories, supra note 95; Status: Anti-Personnel Mines, supra note 104. Similarly, in
2003, the National Council for the Defense of Democracy-Forces for the Defense of Democracy
(CNDD-FDD) signed Geneva Call's Deed. See Signatories, supra note 95. In 2005, the CNDD-FDD
became the Government of Burundi. GENEVA CALL: PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 96, at 9. In 2008,
the Parliament of Burundi enacted legislation implementing the Ottawa Convention. Loi No. 1/30 du 10
Octobre 2008 portant mise en oeuvre de la Convention sur l'Interdiction de l'emploi, du stockage, de la
production et du transfert des mines antipersonnel et sur leur destruction [Law No. 1/30 of Oct. 10, 2008
Concerning the Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling,
Production, and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction] BULLETIN OFFICIEL DU
BURUNDI [BULL. OFF. BURUNDI] [OFFICIAL BULLETIN OF BURUNDI], Oct. 1, 2008.
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will do [their] part to promote it.""' According to Geneva Call, "[p]eer
pressure is a useful tool in this context: armed groups that have signed the Deed
of Commitment can have a significant effect on other groups if they explain
their reasons for adhering to the ban and share their experience, especially in
the area of mine action."I 12 Cognizant of this approach, armed nonstate actors
themselves have indicated that they "[c]ommit to continue to actively promote,
in collaboration with Geneva Call, the Deed of Commitment among non-
signatories." 1 3 In practice, some signatories have indeed gone on to advocate
the importance of a ban on anti-personnel mines to other armed groups, and
Geneva Call has indicated at least one instance where an armed group has
become involved with the mine ban because of the example of others.1 14
The idea of armed groups influencing one another has particular promise
at the local level. If several armed groups are involved in the same armed
conflict, even if they are not formally related, links between them create the
potential for peer influence. Along these lines, when signing the Deed of
Commitment, the Lahu Democratic Front (LDF) stated, "We will do our best to
advocate to other armed Lahu groups to also stop using anti-personnel mines.
As well, we will use our position within the National Democratic Front (NDF)
to encourage other armed opposition groups to ban anti-personnel mines." 15
The effect on other armed groups can also extend across borders and
conflicts. When Ban Landmines Campaign Nepal and Geneva Call organized a
seminar on the role of the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (CPN-M) in the
mine ban, the then-Chairman of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)
Coordinating Committee for the Cessation of Hostilities attended, sharing
MILF's perspective on the mine ban and on "[t]he benefits for confidence-
building that this measure has brought to relations between the MILF and the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines."' 1 6 Similarly, the Executive
Director of the New Sudan Mine Action Directorate, an entity of the SPLM/A,
sent a letter to the ELN of Colombia explaining the reasons why the SPLM/A
banned the use of landmines and appealing to the Government and armed
groups to "[s]ave Colombia . .. from further landmines contamination.", 17
111. GENEVA CALL: DEED OF COMMITMENT, supra note 95, 1 8.
112. GENEVA CALL, AN INCLUSIVE APPROACH TO ARMED NONSTATE ACTORS AND
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN NORMS: REPORT OF THE FIRST MEETING OF SIGNATORIES To GENEVA
CALL'S DEED OF COMMITMENT 23 (2004), available at http://www.genevacall.org/resources/conference
-reports/f-conference-reports/2001-201 0/gc-2004-oct-geneva.pdf.
113. Declaration by Signatories to the "Deed of Commitment under Geneva Callfor Adherence
to a Total Ban on Anti-Personnel Mines and for Cooperation in Mine Action" to the Cartagena Summit
on a Mine-Free World, Nov. 30-Dec. 4 2009 (June 19, 2009), http://www.genevacall.org/resources/
nsas-statements/f-nsas-statements/2001-2010/2009-19jun-finalsign.pdf [hereinafter Declaration by
Signatories].
114. 2 ANKl SJOBERG, GENEVA CALL & THE PROGRAMME FOR THE STUDY OF INT'L ORGS.,
ARMED NONSTATE ACTORS AND LANDMINES: A GLOBAL REPORT OF NSA MINE ACTION 14, 79-81
(2006), available at http://www.genevacall.org/resources/research/f-research/2001-2010/gc-2006-nov-
ansal2.pdf.
115. Aik Long Kham Mwe, Chairman and Gen. Sec., Lahu Democratic Front, Statement on the
Occasion of Signing the Deed of Commitment to Ban Landmines (Apr. 16, 2007).
116. SJOBERG,supra note 114, at 80.
117. Letter from Aleu Ayieny Aleu, Exec. Dir., New Sudan Mine Action Directorate, to the
Ejdrcito de Liberaci6n Nacional 2 (June 2004), available at http://www.genevacall.org/resources/nsas-
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Outside the context of Geneva Call, which remains the most influential
actor in this area, states and intergovernmental organizations have also
recognized the potential for armed groups to influence one another. The U.N.
Secretary-General has observed, for example, that "[i]t is anticipated that the
precedent set by the commitment of the [Sudan Liberation Army] (Minawi)
faction in Darfur to an action plan [on child soldiers] will generate momentum
for other armed groups to follow suit."' Similarly, the Government of the
Philippines stated that it was "encouraged" by the submission of an action plan
on child soldiers by MILF "[a]nd was optimistic that this action plan could be
the springboard of similar negotiations with other non-State actors to halt the
recruitment and use of children."' 19
Materials from armed groups have also proven influential for unrelated
armed groups. For example, several Maoist groups, unrelated to the Chinese
People's Liberation Army (CPLA) or to China, adopted codes of conduct based
on various instructions issued by the CPLA in 1928 and reissued in 1947. The
Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone (RUF) adopted "Eight Codes of
Conduct," which is virtually identical to the CPLA's Eight Points of
Attention,120 and the New People's Army, the armed wing of the National
Democratic Front of the Philippines (NDFP), uses the Three Main Rules of
Discipline and Eight Points of Attention of the CPLA.12 1 Thus, groups that
share similar ideologies have influenced one another regarding humanitarian
norms, and not just rhetoric and tactics.
B. Possible Concerns
Arguments against involving armed groups in law creation usually stem
from assumptions that permitting such participation would affect their legal
status, increase their perceived legitimacy, or lead to the downgrading of
humanitarian law norms. Once again, while quantitative studies do not exist,
qualitative evidence suggests that some of these concerns are overstated. Other
concerns reflect the self-interest of states rather than the broader interests of the
international community, while still others could be assuaged through
restrictions on the way in which armed groups are granted a lawmaking role.
1. Affecting the Legal Status ofArmed Groups
States are likely to object that granting armed groups a role in law
creation will enhance their legal status, possibly upgrading common criminals
statements/f-nsas-statements/2001-2010/2004-0 ljun-splma.pdf
118. U.N. Secretary-General, Rep. ofthe Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict in
the Sudan, 1 36, U.N. Doc. S/2007/520 (Aug. 29, 2007).
119. U.N. Secretary-General, Rep. ofthe Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict in
the Philippines, 47, U.N. Doc. S/2010/36 (Jan. 21, 2010).
120. Prosecutor v. Sesay, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, T 705 (Special
Court for Sierra Leone Mar. 2, 2009).
121. Declaration, Nat'l Democratic Front of the Philippines (NDF-P), Declaration of
Undertaking to Apply the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Protocol I of 1977: Annex C, Basic Rules
of the New People's Army, princ. IV, pt. 3 (May 13, 1969).
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and terrorists to a position on a par with states.122 According to some
commentators, simply applying international humanitarian law to armed groups
results in their being afforded a certain measure of legal status, however that
law is created.123 States are especially likely to be threatened by granting armed
groups a lawmaking role when this role is justified on the basis that these
groups are "state-like" entities because they control territory or exercise
government-like powers.
We do not view this objection as persuasive, however. To begin with, this
concern clearly reflects the self-interest of states. In Klabbers's words, as "gate-
keepers of the system," states have every reason to hesitate about "elevat[ing]
newcomers to their own level" for fear that they would lose some of the
prerogatives that they currently enjoy.124 States may have a keen interest in
maintaining their exclusive or dominant role in lawmaking, but the pertinent
question here is whether such exclusivity or dominance benefits the
international community as a whole rather than states in particular.
There is little reason to fear that granting armed groups some role in
lawmaking will lead to their having the same status as states. As a matter of
positive law, recognizing that different entities are subjects of international law
does not make them akin to states, nor does it mean that they hold the same
rights, duties, and capacities as states.125 For instance, international
organizations can enter into treaties with respect to areas within their spheres of
competence, but they do not have plenary lawmaking powers.126 If armed
groups were given a role in law creation, they could be subject to similar (as
well as additional) constraints.
There are precedents for states' granting armed groups some role in
lawmaking while declaring that this does not affect the groups' legal status.
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions exhorts parties to the conflict to
conclude agreements on international humanitarian law but provides that this
"shall not affect the legal status of the Parties to the conflict."1 27 Likewise,
Geneva Call's Deed of Commitment provides that it "shall not affect our legal
status, pursuant to the relevant clause in common article 3," a provision
included by the drafters "so as not to alarm states."l 28 Although such caveats
122. See, e.g., 2-B FED. POL. DEP'T, FINAL RECORD OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE OF
GENEVA OF 1949, at 330 (1949) (describing General Oung of Burma's argument that "an attempt to
safeguard the legal status of the de jure government .. . will automatically give the insurgents a status as
high as the legal status which is denied to them.").
123. E.g., Georges Abi-Saab, Non-International Armed Conflicts, in INTERNATIONAL
DIMENSIONS OF HUMANITARIAN LAW 217, 223-24 (UNESCO ed., 1998); Ilene Cohn, Protection of
Children in Peacemaking and Peacekeeping Processes, 12 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 129, 155-56 (1999).
124. Klabbers, supra note 72, at 365.
125. Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion,
1949 I.C.J. 174, 178 (Apr. 11).
126. It may prove harder to delimit the lawmaking competence of nonstate actors, such as
armed groups, that do not have a constitutive instrument created by states. Nonetheless, one approach to
limiting their lawmaking power may come from the underlying justification for recognizing such
powers-e.g., where a lawmaking role is justified on the basis that the nonstate actor bears rights and
obligations.
127. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, supra note 1, art. 3.
128. GENEVA CALL: DEED OF COMMITMENT, supra note 95, art. 6; GENEVA CALL, supra note
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will not always appease states' concerns,129 they have been expressly or
impliedly included in many bilateral agreements between states and armed
groups.130
The possibility of enhancing their legal status would certainly be
attractive to some armed groups. For example, the Deed was reportedly
unsatisfactory to the LTTE as it did not treat the group as equal to the
Government of Sri Lanka.' 31 But armed groups have also been willing to
undertake international obligations without this formal incentive. Indeed, a
commander of the SPLM/A has "encouraged Geneva Call to make clear to
armed groups that signature to the Deed of Commitment does not change in
any way their legal status or lend legitimacy to their struggles."l 32 Likewise, the
Declaration of the Second Meeting of Signatories to Geneva Call's Deed,
which was adopted solely by armed nonstate actors, notes that "humanitarian
engagement does not affect the legal status of any actor."13 3
2. Inappropriately Legitimizing Armed Groups
A stronger objection is that engaging armed groups in law creation would
inappropriately legitimize those groups. This concern is often grouped together
with objections about affecting armed groups' legal status. For example, the
African Union Convention on Internally Displaced Persons provides that "[t]he
provisions of this Article shall not, in any way whatsoever, be construed as
affording legal status or legitimizing or recognizing armed groups."l 34 Yet the
107, at 33.
129. For example, in speaking about the clause in Common Article 3, Burma's delegate at the
Diplomatic Conference of 1949 took the view that the sentence was "only a bait ... which I hope will
fail in its object. Whether or not you safeguard the legal status of the de jure government, the mere
inclusion of this Article in an international Convention will automatically give the insurgents a status as
high as the legal status which is denied to them. It can easily be imagined that this paragraph is going to
be an encouragement and an incentive to the insurgents." FED. POL. DEP'T, supra note 122, at 330.
130. Some agreements include an express clause to this effect. See, e.g., Government-FARC
Humanitarian Exchange Accord, Colom.-FARC, June 2, 2001, available at http://www.c-r.org/our-
work/accord/colombia/humanitarian-exchange-accord.php; Comprehensive Agreement on Respect for
Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law between the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines and the National Democratic Front of the Philippines, pt. VI, art. 3, Phil.-NDFP, Mar. 16,
1998, available at http://www.incore.ulst.ac.uk/services/cds/agreements/pdf/phil8.pdf. Others include
the clause by incorporation, quoting from or referring to Common Article 3. See, e.g., Agreement No. 1,
Bosn.-Herz., May 22, 1992, reprinted in 2 How DOES LAW PROTECT IN WAR? CASES, DOCUMENTS
AND TEACHING MATERIALS ON CONTEMPORARY PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
1112 (Marco Sassali & Antoine Bouvier eds., 1999).
131. Soliman M. Santos, Jr., A Critical Reflection on the Geneva Call Instrument and Approach
in Engaging Armed Groups on Humanitarian Norms: A Southern Perspective 15 (Oct. 31, 2003)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.armedgroups.org/sites/armedgroups.org/files/santos
_paper.pdf.
132. GENEVA CALL, supra note 107, at 33.
133. Declaration of the Second Meeting of Signatories to Geneva Call's "Deed of Commitment
for Adherence to a Total Ban on Anti-Personnel Mines and for Cooperation in Mine Action" (June 19,
2009), available at http://www.genevacall.org/resources/nsas-statements/f-nsas-statements/200 1-
2010/2009-19jun-finalpart.pdf.
134. African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced
Persons in Africa art. 7(1), Oct. 22, 2009, available at http://www.africa-union.org/rootlar/index/
Convention%20on%20IDPs%20_Eng_%20-%2OFinal.pdf; see Corte Constitucional [C.C.]
[Constitutional Court], May 15, 1995, Sentencia C-225/95 (Colom.), reprinted and translated in 2 How
DOES LAW PROTECT IN WAR?, supra note 130, at 2266, 1 17; Special Representative of the Sec.-Gen.,
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two objections are distinct, as it is possible to enhance the perceived legitimacy
of an armed group without formally affecting its legal status, though one may
lead to the other.135
States are often reluctant to do anything that may legitimize the armed
groups with which they are in conflict.136 For example, during a 2009 Security
Council debate on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, Vietnam stated
that, "[r]eality has proved that, while possibly effective in certain cases,
dialogue with non-State armed groups must be carefully considered and
approached in the overall framework of cooperation with the States in question
in order to avoid the unintended legitimization of illegal or even internationally
recognized terrorist groups."' 37 The Government of Myanmar prevented U.N.
entities from engaging with Burmese armed groups on child soldier issues due
to legitimacy concerns.'38 And the Government of Afghanistan expressed
concern that the international community engaging with the Taliban might
change perceptions of the conflict and the Government's relative status within
it, "reduc[ing] the Government from being a sovereign to being a mere faction
in a civil war."' 39
On occasion, engagement with armed groups on the part of NGOs or
international organizations has led to the organization's expulsion from the
territory in question.140 Some states have even prohibited the provision of any
sort of assistance to armed groups that are considered terrorist organizations.
The U.S. Supreme Court, for instance, has held that providing advice or
training on international humanitarian law to the LTTE and the Kurdistan
Workers' Party (PKK) could amount to providing material support to terrorist
groups in violation of U.S. law.141 The judgment warns that such support
"lend[s] legitimacy to foreign terrorist groups-legitimacy that makes it easier
for those groups to persist, to recruit members, and to raise funds-all of which
Rep. of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, 1 51, U.N.
Doc. A/60/335 (Sept. 7, 2005).
135. See Dawn Steinhoff, Talking to the Enemy: State Legitimacy Concerns with Engaging
Non-State Armed Groups, 45 TEX. INT'L L.J. 297, 301 (2009).
136. For example, legitimacy concerns may play a part in a state's denial of the existence of an
armed conflict, failure to recognize an armed group as a party to the conflict, or failure to conclude a
bilateral agreement on international humanitarian law. INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, IMPROVING
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: EXPERT SEMINARS 20 (2003) [hereinafter
INT'L COMM. RED CROSS, EXPERT SEMINARS]; INT'L COMM. RED CROSS, supra note 89, at 17.
137. U.N. SCOR, 64th Sess., 6151st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.6151, at 9 (June 26, 2009).
138. U.N. Secretary General, Rep. of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict,
158, U.N. Doc. A/62/609-S/2007/757 (Dec. 21, 2007); see also U.N. Secretary General, Rep. of the
Secretary General on Children and Armed Conflict in Myanmar, 48-49, U.N. Doc. S/2007/666 (Nov.
16, 2007) ("The principal issue impeding dialogue with non-State actors who remain in conflict with the
Government military is the restrictive stance of the Government regarding engagement by the United
Nations with these armed groups.").
139. Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Rep. ofthe Special
Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Institutions: Mission to Afghanistan, 1 42, U.N.
Doc. A/HRC/I 1/2/Add.4 (May 6, 2009) (by Philip Alston).
140. Nicolas Florquin & Elisabeth Decrey Warner, Engaging Non-State Armed Groups or
Listing Terrorists? Implications for the Arms Control Community, 1 DISARMAMENT F. 17, 19 (2008).
141. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010). But see id. at 2731 (Breyer,
J., dissenting).
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facilitate more terrorist attacks."l42 Given that certain states consider mere
engagement with armed groups an unacceptable acknowledgement of such
groups, granting them a role in law creation may be viewed as further
legitimizing them.
There are reasons to be skeptical of the legitimacy objection, however.
Concems about legitimacy are often skewed in one direction: the concern more
often raised is whether engaging an armed group in dialogue will legitimize it;
the concern less often raised is whether failing to do so will legitimize a
state. 143 Moreover, the characterization of an armed group as a terrorist group is
frequently a political one. Although states that are involved in noninternational
armed conflicts may characterize their opponents as terrorists, not everyone
will share that perspective. For example, during the 2011 armed conflict in
Libya, Colonel Gaddafi accused the armed group headed by the Transitional
National Council of being a terrorist organization.144 A number of states,
however, recognized the Council as the "legitimate governing authority." 45
Not dealing with armed groups that appear on terrorist lists may also be
problematic. As an EU official noted, the Humanitarian Aid department of the
European Commission needs "to act in full conformity with relevant
legislation, and therefore cannot either engage directly or fund any organisation
that is on its terrorist list. At the same time . . . it is very difficult to ignore some
organisations that are on the list." 46
It will always be hard to strike a balance between constructively engaging
with armed groups in order to improve humanitarian conditions and not
legitimizing those groups or their causes. Different entities will strike this
balance in different ways. For instance, the Special Rapporteur on
Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions met with armed groups,147 but
chose not to meet with the Taliban due to political sensitivities. He later
declared this a "mistake" as "[t]aking account of information provided by such
sources would permit a more nuanced understanding of Taliban and other
142. Id. at 2725. But see id. at 2736-37 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("This 'legitimacy' justification
cannot by itself warrant suppression of political speech, advocacy, and association . . . [and] itself is
inconsistent with critically important First Amendment case law.").
143. Olivier Bangerter, The ICRC and Non-State Armed Groups, in EXPLORING CRITERIA &
CONDITIONS FOR ENGAGING ARMED NON-STATE ACTORS TO RESPECT HUMANITARIAN LAW & HUMAN
RIGHTS LAW 74 (2008), available at http://www.genevacall.org/resources/conference-reports/f-
conference-reports/2001-201 0/gc-2007-04-05jun-geneva.pdf.
144. See, e.g., Ian Black, Libya Rebels Rejects Gaddafi 's Al-Qaida Spin, GUARDIAN (Mar. 1,
2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/20 11/mar/01 /gaddafi-libya-al-qaida-lifg-protesters.
145. See, e.g., Chair's Press Statement, Fourth Meeting of the Libya Contact Group (July 15,
2011), available at http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/rmi/168764.htm ("Representatives from 32 countries
and 7 international organizations . . . agreed to deal with the National Transitional Council (NTC) as the
legitimate governing authority in Libya.").
146. GENEVA CALL AND INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT MONITORING CENTER, ARMED NON-STATE
ACTORS AND THE PROTECTION OF INTERNALLY DISPLACED PEOPLE (2011), available at
http://www.genevacall.org/news/events/f-events/2001-2010/GC SEGVAIDMC/GC_2011_ANSAs
Report EN.pdf.
147. Special Rapporteur to the Secretary-General, Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on
Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions: Mission to Philippines, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/3/Add.2
(Apr. 16, 2008) (by Philip Alston) (describing engagement with nonstate groups such as the NDF-P).
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[antigovernment element] strategies."l48 The Special Rapporteur indicated that,
"while . . . contacts could indeed be pursued in ways that might somehow
'legitimize' these groups, contact in order to request its view on particular
incidents, criticize its conduct, and urge better human rights and IHL
compliance does not 'legitimize' that group."l49
Even though states may dislike or object to engagement with armed
groups, we argue that such engagement may be justified if it leads to concrete
benefits, such as increased knowledge of and compliance with international
humanitarian law. As the U.N. Secretary-General has stated in making the case
for engaging with armed groups in general, not just in the context of law
creation:
We must . . . focus more attention on compliance with international
humanitarian law by non-State armed groups. Unpalatable as it may be for
some States, engagement with such groups is critical. The United Nations must
be able to talk to all warring parties, including armed groups. Failure to do so is
always likely to mean more, not fewer, civilians killed and wounded. I urge
Member States to accept this necessity. . . . We know from experience that
regular engagement, monitoring and reporting creates a culture in which both
States and non-State groups are increasingly being made aware of the need to
respect international humanitarian law. 5 0
Against this, there is a risk that armed groups will seek to improve their
reputations by issuing unilateral declarations or concluding bilateral agreements
declaring an intention to respect international humanitarian law even when they
have no real intention of complying with the terms of these documents.' This
danger, however, is not unique to armed groups; it also exists in relation to a
state's ratification of humanitarian law conventions.152 We do not view this risk
as sufficient to prevent armed groups from playing a role in lawmaking.
Nonetheless, it is worth looking for ways to mitigate this danger when
modeling the specific ways in which armed groups might play a role in
lawmaking.' 53
3. Downgrading Humanitarian Law Protections
The strongest concern from the perspective of the international
148. Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Institutions, supra
note 139, 42.
149. Id. 143.
150. Press Release, Ban Ki-Moon, U.N. Secretary-General, Honouring Geneva Conventions,
Secretary-General says Debate "No Longer between Peace and Justice but between Peace and What
Kind of Justice," U.N. Doc. SG/SM/12494 (Sept. 26, 2009), available at http://www.un.org/News/
Press/docs/2009/sgsml2494.doc.htm; see also Rep. of the Secretary-General on the Protection of
Civilians in Armed Conflict, supra note 96, IT 40, 45 (advocating engagement and dialogue with armed
groups to protect civilians). Engagement with armed groups may also form confidence-building
measures, which can in turn lead to the fostering of relationships and rapport. See Bangerter, supra note
143, at 83.
151. See INT'L COMM. RED CROSS, EXPERT SEMINARS, supra note 136, at 21; INT'L COMM.
RED CROSS, supra note 89, at 19; Frangois Bugnion, Jus ad bellum, jus in bello and Non-International
Armed Conflicts, in YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 167, 194 (Tim McCormack &
Avril McDonald eds., 2003).
152. INT'L COMM. RED CROSS, supra note 89, at 20; Bugnion, supra note 151, at 194.
153. Bugnion, supra note 151, at 194; see infra Part III.C.
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community, as distinct from the self-interested perspective of states involved in
noninternational armed conflicts, is that allowing armed groups to play a role in
law creation might lead to the downgrading of humanitarian law protections.
For example, would permitting armed groups a role in lawmaking in the future
allow these groups to declare themselves not bound by existing legal
obligations? Could they hold up the process of reaching agreement on new
norms or water down the content of such norms during negotiations? Much
depends on how the lawmaking role of armed groups is conceived, which we
address in Part III.C. We argue that giving armed groups a role in lawmaking is
not the same as giving them a license to dictate the content of the law and that
armed groups should not be given a role equal to that of states or be able to
displace existing legal obligations. However, before discussing the ways in
which the concerns about ratcheting down protections may be addressed, it is
worth making three points.
First, it cannot be assumed that involving armed groups in law creation
would necessarily lead to the downgrading of legal standards. There are
certainly cases where the practice of armed groups appears to be at odds with
the requirements of international humanitarian law (for example in
targeting).154 Nonetheless, there are other cases where armed groups have
undertaken obligations above and beyond those of states or existing
international law. For example, the Ottawa Convention prohibits mines that are
"designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person,"
while Geneva Call goes further and prohibits mines that have that effect,
whether or not they are actually designed for that purpose.155 In addition, the
fact that forty-one armed groups have signed Geneva Call's Deed of
Commitment, taken together with the existence of groups that have not signed
the Deed but have indicated their general approval of the ban,156 arguably
moves the prohibition on land mines closer towards inclusion as a principle of
154. Contrary to the position under existing international humanitarian law, a number of armed
groups have asserted that various classes of persons may be legitimately attacked. See, e.g., Prosecutor
v. Limaj, Case No. IT-03-66, Transcript, (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 19, 2004),
available at http://www.icty.org/x/cases/limaj/trans/en/041119ED.htm ("[A]II Serbian forces, whether
the police, the military, or armed civilians, are our enemy."); FRENTE FARABUNDO MARTi PARA LA
LIBERACli6N NACIONAL, THE LEGITIMACY OF OUR METHODS OF STRUGGLE 8-9 (1988) (arguing that it
is permissible to capture mayors and members of the civil defense, and target military advisors);
Declaration, National Democratic Front of the Philippines, Declaration of Undertaking to Apply the
Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Protocol I of 1977 (July 5, 1996), available at http://www.hartford-
hwp.com/archives/54a/036.html (asserting that it is permissible to attack "units, personnel and facilities
belonging to" the armed forces, national police, paramilitary forces, and intelligence personnel);
Statement, Kurdistan Workers' Party, Statement to the United Nations, (Jan. 24, 1995), available at
http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/51/009.html (arguing that it is permissible to attack members of
the armed forces, contra-guerrilla forces, the intelligence service, the gendarmerie, and village guards).
155. Ottawa Convention, supra note 2, art. 2(1) (emphasis added); see also GENEVA CALL:
DEED OF COMMITMENT, supra note 95, art. 1.
156. See, e.g., Position Statement on Landmine Use, National Democratic Front (Burma),
Letter No. 01-2007 (Jan. 29, 2007), available at http://www.genevacall.org/resources/nsas-statements/f-
nsas-statements/2001-2010/2007-28feb-ndfpdf (condemning the indiscriminate use of landmines,
allowing the use of landmines in self-defense, but subjecting such use to specific conditions); Statement
on the Use of Landmines, Karenni National Progressive Party, Statement No. 02/06 (Aug. 31, 2006),
available at http://www.genevacall.org/resources/nsas-statements/f-nsas-statements/2001-2010/2006-
31 aug06-2-knpp.pdf (condemning the use of landmines but allowing such use to defend troops in
military zones).
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customary international law. In the meantime, forty-one armed groups have
voluntarily accepted additional humanitarian law obligations.
Second, awareness of areas of the law in which the views of states and
armed groups diverge can be instructive for identifying breaches of existing
law as well as potential for the future development of the law.157 The breach of
an existing custom is simultaneously a seed for a new legality.158 Where armed
groups violate legal standards but seek to justify their conduct within the
boundaries of the existing rule and its exceptions, their breaches have the effect
of reinforcing rather than undermining the referenced legal prohibitions.
However, when armed groups openly violate a legal standard and attempt to
justify their position by calling for a change in existing rules or understandings,
their practice may contribute towards the development of customary norms if
their position is accepted or acquiesced to by other relevant actors.
Identifying areas where the law is breached systematically may be useful
in considering whether the law is realistic or unachievable. As Sass6li explains,
allowing armed groups to participate in the formation of international
humanitarian law "would constitute the best way to ensure that compliance
with IHL is realistic" for such groups. 5  Just as the law of naval warfare would
not be revised without considering the practice and views of navies, Sass6li
reasons that armed groups should be involved in the creation of international
humanitarian law because the essence of such law is that it is created and
applied by the parties based on "an understanding of the problems, the
dilemmas and the aspirations of the parties to armed conflicts."l 60 Although the
law should not always be amended to reflect actual practice, when law and
practice systematically diverge, it is worth examining whether the law has been
appropriately adapted to the circumstances.
Accordingly, considering the practice of armed groups may prove useful
in shaping international humanitarian law. For example, the practice of armed
groups may demonstrate the inadequacies of international humanitarian law
taking a "one size fits all" approach in all circumstances and might support the
recognition of different standards for states and armed groups, or for different
types of states and armed groups, in certain circumstances. Some room for
differentiation is already built into certain humanitarian law rules, such as those
obliging parties to act "within the limits of their capabilities"' 61 or "to the
fullest extent practicable." 62 There have also been suggestions that the
157. Sassbli,supra note 91, at 9.
158. ANTHONY A. D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 97-98
(1971).
159. Sassbli, supra note 73, at 20.
160. Marco Sassbli, The Implementation of International Humanitarian Law: Current and
Inherent Challenges, in YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 45, 64 (2007).
161. Additional Protocol II, supra note 1, art. 5(2).
162. Id. art. 7(2); see also id. art. 4(3)(b) ("all appropriate steps shall be taken"); id art. 8
("[w]henever circumstances permit"); id. art. 17 ("all possible measures"). The key here is not to water
down core legal standards but to permit some differentiation in circumstances where doing so would
make non-core standards more realistic and achievable. See generally Sandesh Sivakumaran, Re-
Envisaging the International Law ofInternal Armed Conflict, 22 EUR. J. INT'L L. 219, 253-60 (2011)
(describing different ways to tailor norms to meet the particularities of the situation).
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differing abilities of states should be taken into account when assessing
compliance with their humanitarian law obligations.16 3 Thus, an armed group
that exercises control over a significant portion of territory and operates as a de
facto government may be able to assume obligations akin to those of states,
while imposing similar obligations on groups with lesser levels of control or
without relevant resources could prove meaningless.
A good example of this differentiation of responsibilities is the
prohibition on sentencing and execution prior to a fair trial by a regularly
constituted court. The FMLN in El Salvador advocated that "the type of
tribunal and law required by [Additional] Protocol II have to be adapted to the
conditions and capacity of the contending party; the particular mechanisms
necessary for defense must be adjusted to the real possibilities of the zone
where the trial is held." 6 4 Similarly, the LTTE took the view that the nature of
its judicial system varied with the level of territorial control that it had.
According to the Head of the LTTE Judicial Division:
In the beginning we were a guerrilla organization, engaging in hit and run
tactics against the Sri Lankan armed forces. We had no stable control over large
territories or populations. Therefore we neither had the resources nor the
environment to set up and run a proper judicial system. But in 1993, as soon as
we were in control of most of the north, our leader established the Tamil Eelam
Judiciary and College of Law.'65
Finally, there may also be merit in allowing armed groups to advocate for
changes to humanitarian law norms even when states and armed groups have
divergent views. States may have a collective interest in not recognizing the
interests of armed groups, but this interest may not necessarily be shared by the
broader international community. Armed groups would be likely to campaign,
for example, for combatant immunity and prisoner-of-war status for their
fighters taken captive, as was the case with the National Liberation Front of
Algeria.166 States have a clear interest in not recognizing this as a customary
law obligation because they would be prevented from trying members of an
armed group for taking part in hostilities. Nonetheless, the international
community may have a different interest if armed groups would be more likely
to comply with humanitarian law were they to receive combatant immunity or
prisoner-of-war status in exchange.16 7
The advantages and disadvantages of giving armed groups a role in
lawmaking must be weighed against each other and should be judged by
reference to the needs of the international community. Further work needs to be
163. For example, the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission noted that, when assessing what
was meant by "required" medical care, it was "mindful" that it was dealing with two states with "very
limited resources." Partial Award on Prisoners of War, Eritrea's Claim 17, (Eri. v. Eth.) 42 I.L.M. 1083,
1 117 (Eri.-Eth. Claims Comm'n 2003).
164. FRENTE FARABUNDO MARTi PARA LA LIBERACi6N NACIONAL, supra note 154, at 20.
165. Interview with E. Pararajasingham, Head, Tamil Eelam Legal System (Oct. 30, 2003),
available at http://www.tamilnation.co/tamileelam/defacto/031030judicial.htm.
166. ALGERIAN OFFICE, WHITE PAPER ON THE APPLICATION OF THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF
1949 TO THE FRENCH-ALGERIAN CONFLICT 23-25 (1960).
167. See INT'L COMM. RED CROSS, EXPERT SEMINARS, supra note 136, at 22-23; Bugnion,
supra note 151, at 194-95; Sassbli, supra note 73, at 26.
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undertaken on the merits. However, the evidence that exists to date suggests
that, at least with respect to certain groups and certain norms, there is a link
between allowing armed groups a role in the creation of international
humanitarian law and their increased compliance with that law. Insofar as the
downsides are concerned, many relate to the self-interest of states and should
thus feature less strongly in the balancing equation. The strongest potential
disadvantage relates to a weakening of humanitarian protections, which would
be contrary to the interests of the international community. Nonetheless, many
of the advantages and disadvantages depend on the manner in which armed
groups could play a role in law creation, an issue to which we now turn.
C. Proposals for Moving Forward
Granting armed groups a role in lawmaking could mean many things:
armed groups could remain bound by existing legal obligations or be given the
right to opt out of these obligations; they could be given a right to participate in
the creation of new legal norms but not a right to declare themselves bound by
those norms; or they could be given the right to adopt new norms as binding
upon them without being granted a role in the law creation process. Those
favoring a traditional approach to the doctrine of sources would contend that
armed groups remain bound by existing legal obligations imposed by states and
should have no role in the creation or adoption of new legal norms. By contrast,
those who strongly support the rights of nonstate actors in general or armed
groups in particular would argue that such groups should not be bound by
existing legal obligations because they played no role in their creation and have
not consented to them, and should be given rights on par with states to
participate in the creation and adoption of new legal norms.
We do not support either position. Instead we chart an intermediate
course. For the reasons set out above, the traditional, statist approach to the
doctrine of sources is both descriptively outdated and normatively questionable.
Nonetheless, giving armed groups plenary lawmaking powers would
effectively upgrade them to the level of states and would subordinate the
interests of the international community as a whole to the interests of armed
groups. Accordingly, we argue for striking a balance between recognizing the
interests of armed groups in creating and developing international humanitarian
law and maintaining important humanitarian protections. Specifically, we
propose that armed groups should remain bound by existing obligations but be
given certain roles in the norm creation process going forward, including being
granted the formal capacity to recognize existing obligations and to undertake
new ones. These roles can take a number of different forms.
1. Unilateral Declarations
We contend that armed groups should be permitted, even encouraged, to
issue binding unilateral declarations through which they commit to respect
existing international humanitarian law obligations and take on additional
obligations. In the Nuclear Tests cases, the ICJ recognized that, with respect to
1412012]
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states, "declarations made by way of unilateral acts, concerning legal or factual
situations, may have the effect of creating legal obligations," depending on the
intention of the state making the declaration and how it may be reasonably
understood by other actors.168 Under our proposal, unilateral declarations from
armed groups would be given weight analogous to unilateral declarations from
states. International law generally sets a high bar for determining that a
statement amounts to a binding unilateral declaration.' 69 We argue, however,
that when declarations on humanitarian norms are issued in the midst of a
noninternational armed conflict or cast in legal language, there should be a
presumption that they are binding. We recommend that these declarations be
made publicly available, preferably in a centralized repository, so that they can
be easily accessed, monitored by various entities, and can potentially influence
other armed groups. We also support the introduction of verification
mechanisms, such as those adopted by Geneva Call with respect to its Deed, in
order to hold armed groups accountable for the commitments they have
made.17 0 This would help ensure that only those armed groups that genuinely
intend to comply with their obligations issue unilateral declarations.
Our proposal builds on existing practice. A number of armed groups have
already issued unilateral declarations in which they agree to be, or recognize
that they already are, bound by certain humanitarian law obligations. This has
occurred on both an ad hoc basis and in more structured environments. Geneva
Call provides the best example of the structured approach, but it is not the only
one. States themselves have envisaged the possibility of national liberation
movements adopting unilateral declarations undertaking to comply with
particular humanitarian law treaties. Article 96(3) of Additional Protocol I
permits national liberation movements to "undertake to apply" the Geneva
Conventions and Additional Protocol 1.171 The effect of such an undertaking is
that:
(a) the Conventions and this Protocol are brought into force for the [national
liberation movement] as a Party to the conflict with immediate effect; (b) the
[national liberation movement] assumes the same rights and obligations as
those which have been assumed by a High Contracting Party to the
Conventions and this Protocol; and (c) the Conventions and this Protocol are
equally binding upon all Parties to the conflict.' 72
The 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons adopts a similar
framework.' 73 No instruments applicable in noninternational armed conflict
include a specific mechanism for unilateral declarations, but numerous armed
groups have made such declarations nonetheless. For instance, the FMLN and
the PKK issued unilateral declarations in which they committed to abide by
168. Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 253, % 43-46 (Dec. 20); see also Frontier Dispute
(Burk. Faso v. Mali), 1986 I.C.J. 4, 39 (Dec. 22).
169. See Nuclear Tests, 1974 I.C.J. at T44.
170. See supra Part Ill.A.
171. Additional Protocol I, supra note 81, art. 96(3).
172. Id. art. 96.
173. Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, supra note 2, art. 7(4).
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international humanitarian law.' 74
There is some acceptance in the literature of the binding nature of
unilateral declarations made by nonstate actors.'75 Geneva Call treats its Deed
of Commitment as binding on its signatories, as do the signatories
themselves.' 7 6 On occasion, international courts have also referred favorably to
undertakings by armed groups. For example, in the Advisory Opinion on the
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, the ICJ noted that Palestine had submitted a unilateral declaration
undertaking to comply with the Fourth Geneva Convention, which the
depository had treated as "valid." 77 Similarly, in the Akayesu trial judgment,
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda noted that the Rwandan
Patriotic Front (RPF) had "stated to the International Committee of the Red
Cross that it was bound by the rules of international humanitarian law." 78
Outside the courtroom, various U.N. entities have treated unilateral declarations
of armed groups as binding and have called upon the international community
to monitor and enforce such undertakings.179
In our view, recognizing the possibility of armed groups making binding
unilateral declarations should be relatively uncontroversial. Given that armed
groups would be committing to respect existing obligations or to take on
additional obligations, the risk of downgrading legal obligations does not arise.
Accordingly, the fact that these commitments would emanate from armed
groups alone, without any involvement on the part of states, is not problematic.
The lack of direct interaction between states and armed groups also minimizes
concerns about legitimizing armed groups by treating them on par with states.
Adopting a unilateral declaration approach would also leave the traditional
architecture of international law-which is based primarily on treaties, custom
and general principles-unaffected.
2. Hybrid Treaties
a. Bilateral or Trilateral Treaties
In addition to favoring unilateral declarations, we propose that armed
174. See, e.g., FRENTE FARABUNDO MARTi PARA LA LIBERACliN NACIONAL, supra note 154,
at 7; Statement, Kurdistan Worker's Party, supra note 154.
175. E.g., CLAPHAM, supra note 60, at 19-20; Klabbers, supra note 72, at 351-69.
176. Thus, signatories monitor their commitments through self-reporting, issuing internal orders
and sanctioning non-compliance. Geneva Call engages in third-party monitoring and verification
missions to investigate allegations of violations. See GENEVA CALL: PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 96,
at 18-19, 25-28.
177. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 91 (July 9). The text of Switzerland's note of information sent to
State Parties to the Geneva Conventions is reprinted in Palestine and the Geneva Conventions, 274
INT'L REV. RED CROSS 64, 64 (1990).
178. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, 627 (Sept. 2, 1998).
179. See Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Additional Rep. of the Special
Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, 1 20, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/2000/71 (Feb. 9, 2000) (by Olara Otunnu); Special Rapporteur to the Secretary-General, Rep. of
the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, 30, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/2006/53/Add.5 (Mar. 27, 2006) (by Philip Alston).
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groups should be encouraged to conclude agreements on international
humanitarian law with states and state-empowered bodies such as international
organizations. Through these agreements, the parties would affirm their
intention to comply with existing obligations or agree to bring new legal
obligations into play. As these agreements would be modeled on treaties, and
share with treaties the characteristic of being binding on the parties, we term
them "hybrid treaties." This terminology is not intended to suggest that these
instruments are quasi-binding or akin to soft law. Instead, although just as
obligatory as treaties proper, these agreements are hybrid in the sense of being
concluded between subjects with recognized lawmaking capacities (states and
international organizations) and ones without (armed groups).
As with unilateral declarations, this recommendation builds on existing
practices. For instance, the Government of the Philippines and the NDFP
entered into an agreement on human rights and international humanitarian
law; 80 the Government of Sudan and the SPLM/A concluded an agreement on
the protection of civilians; s8 and the Government of the Philippines and the
MILF reconfirmed their obligations to respect humanitarian and human rights
law.182 Humanitarian law obligations also form a common component of
ceasefire and peace agreements entered into between governments and armed
groups, such as those between the Government of Guatemala and the Unidad
Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG), the Government of El
Salvador and the FMLN, and the Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF. 83
Armed groups have also entered into tripartite agreements with states and U.N.
entities in which they accept certain humanitarian law obligations, such as the
Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of Sudan, the
SPLM/A, and the United Nations regarding U.N. Mine Action Support to
Sudan. 184
To date, some international and domestic courts have rejected the idea
that agreements involving armed groups amount to treaties or are binding under
international law on the basis that only states can create international
obligations. The Colombian Constitutional Court has held that agreements
concluded pursuant to common Article 3 "are not, strictly speaking, treaties, as
they are not established between entities subject to public international law but
between the parties to an internal conflict, which are subject to international
180. Comprehensive Agreement on Respect for Human Rights and International Humanitarian
Law, Phil.-NDFP, supra note 130.
181. Agreement to Protect Non-Combatant Civilians and Civilian Facilities from Military
Attack, Sudan-SPLM (Mar. 10, 2002), available at http://www.ecosonline.org/reports/2002/Agreement
betweenthegovemementandsplm.pdf.
182. Agreement on the Civilian Protection Component of the Intemational Monitoring Team,
Phil.-MILF (Oct. 27, 2009), available at http://hdcentre.org/files/Agreement%20on%20Civilian
%20Protection%20Component%20of%2oIMT_27%200ct%2009.pdf
183. See Bell, supra note 67, at 381. See generally CHRISTINE BELL, PEACE AGREEMENTS AND
HUMAN RIGHTS (2000); CHRISTINE BELL, ON THE LAW OF PEACE (2008) [hereinafter BELL, ON THE
LAW OF PEACE] (discussing the extent to which peace agreements contain obligations relating to human
rights and humanitarian law).
184. Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 103.
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humanitarian law."'8 5 Similarly, the Special Court of Sierra Leone held that the
Lom6 Agreement between the Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF was
not a treaty because it was signed by the government and an armed group,186
though this conclusion has been criticized.' 87
This cursory dismissal of such agreements is not convincing, however.
Although the VCLT applies to international agreements between states, it does
not preclude recognition of international agreements between other subjects of
international law. 88 The international community has also recognized the
possibility of international organizations entering into treaties with states and
each other.'89 Accordingly, this approach, which was mooted during the
drafting of the Convention,' 90 recognizes agreements entered into by subjects
of international law, such as armed groups.
Again, there is some practice on point. The ICTY has treated the May 22,
1992 agreement between representatives of the President of the Republic of
Bosnia-Herzegovina, the President of the Serbian Democratic Party, the
President of the Party of Democratic Action, and the President of the Croatian
Democratic Community, in which the parties committed to respect certain
humanitarian law obligations, as binding on the parties.191 Similarly, the
Independent Commission of Inquiry on Darfur noted that the Sudan Liberation
Movement/Army (SLMIA) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)
"'possess under customary international law the power to enter into binding
international agreements (jus contrahendi), and have entered into various
185. Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], mayo 15, 1995, Sentencia C-225/95
(Colom.), reprinted and translated in 2 How DOES LAW PROTECT IN WAR?, supra note 130, at 2266,
17.
186. Prosecutor v. Kallon & Kamara, Case No. SCSL-04-15-AR72(E), Decision on Challenge
to Jurisdiction: Lom6 Accord Amnesty, 1145-50 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda Mar. 13, 2004).
187. See, e.g., Bell, supra note 67, at 387; Antonio Cassese, The Special Court and
International Law: The Decision Concerning the Lome Agreement Amnesty, 2 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST.
1130, 1134-35 (2004).
188. VCLT, supra note 25, art. 3; see Documents of the Second Part of the Seventeenth Session
and of the Eighteenth Session Including the Reps. of the Commission to the Gen. Assembly, reprinted in
[1966] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 190, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1966/Add.l.
189. VCLT-IO, supra note 23.
190. Summary Records of the Fourteenth Session: 24 Apr.-29 June, 1962, [1962] 1 Y.B. Int'l L.
Comm'n 58, 170, U.N. Doc. A/C.N.4/Ser.A/1962 (indicating that reference to "other subjects of
international law" included entities such as the Holy See, international organizations, insurgent
communities and belligerents which had received de facto recognition); Documents of the Fourteenth
Session Including the Rep. of the Comm'n to the Gen. Assembly, [1962] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 164,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1962/Add.l ("The phrase 'other subjects of international law' is primarily
intended to cover international organizations, to remove any doubt about the Holy See and to leave room
for more special cases such as an insurgent community to which a measure of recognition has been
accorded.").
191. Agreement No. 1, supra note 130. The ICTY has used the agreement primarily as a means
by which to bring into force certain other treaty provisions that could then form the basis of prosecution.
See Prosecutor v. Galid, Case No. IT-98-29-A, Judgment, 119 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Nov. 30, 2006); Prosecutor v. Blaskid, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgment, 1 172 (Int'l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 3, 2000); Prosecutor v. Furund2ija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T,
Judgment, 135 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 1998). For various views on the
legal status of agreements between states and armed groups, see BELL, ON THE LAW OF PEACE, supra
note 183, at 128-32; ZEGVELD, supra note 94, at 28-30; Cassese, supra note 187, at 1130; and P.H.
Kooijmans, The Security Council and Nonstate Entities as Parties to Conflicts, in INTERNATIONAL LAW:
THEORY AND PRACTICE 333 (Karel Wellens ed., 1998).
THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
internationally binding agreements with the Government" on issues pertaining
to international humanitarian law.192
The name "hybrid treaty" has both symbolic and substantive importance.
Symbolically, the characterization eases concerns about affecting the legal
status or perceived legitimacy of armed groups as it signals that these entities
are not being treated on par with states. Substantively, the notion of hybridity
supports the argument that, even if armed groups are given some role in law
creation, it need not be coextensive with the plenary lawmaking power of
states. The lawmaking role of armed groups could be limited in certain ways: it
could be confined to particular substantive areas (such as international
humanitarian law) or subject to certain constraints (such as the continued
application of existing laws). Furthermore, given that armed groups would be
entering into hybrid treaties with states or state-empowered bodies (in
accordance with their powers as defined by states), states maintain a direct or
indirect role in relation to the parties with which they are entering into such
binding agreements.
There is some precedent for the notion of hybrid treaties in the area of
peace agreements. For example, Bell has called for the creation of a new law of
peace agreements (lex pacificatoria) in order to account for their hybridity in
terms of parties (state and nonstate) and content (international and domestic
law). 193 As evidenced by the examples above, this hybrid approach has
potential outside the realm of peace agreements. It would also give a more
formal legal status to ad hoc bilateral agreements that are frequently concluded
between states and armed groups, some of which have been expressly
welcomed by the international community.194
b. Multilateral Treaties
Multilateral treaties are different from bilateral and trilateral treaties, not
because of the number of parties that sign them but because they are open
rather than closed. Different approaches could be used to integrate armed
groups into multilateral treaties. State parties might give armed groups a role in
treaty negotiations, whether direct or indirect. Alternatively, or in addition, the
international community could recognize a right for armed groups to ratify or
accede to the treaty. Another approach would be to provide for the possibility
of a unilateral undertaking to abide by treaty commitments within the
framework of the treaty itself. The modalities for creating a role for armed
groups in multilateral treaties are complicated, and we recognize that different
strategies will be necessary. However, we have drawn on existing practices in
order to provide a framework for future debates about how armed groups might
192. Rep. of the Indep. Comm'n of Inquiry on Darfur to the Secretary-General, 1 174, U.N.
Doc. S/2005/60 (Feb. 1, 2005).
193. Bell, supra note 67, at 407-10. See generally BELL, ON THE LAW OF PEACE, supra note
183 (investigating the history and nature of peace agreements, and their relationship to law, and arguing
for the existence of a developing "law of the peacemaker," or lex pacificatoria).
194. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 45/172, U.N. Doc. AIRES/45/172 (Dec. 18, 1990) (welcoming the
Government of El Salvador-FMLN Agreement on Human Rights).
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be integrated into multilateral humanitarian law treaties.
In terms of a direct role in the negotiating process, armed groups could be
given a formal role in international humanitarian law treaty negotiations. These
groups could seek to affect the content of these treaties to reflect better their
interests and realities, even if states remain in control of the final formulation of
obligations. For example, certain national liberation movements were entitled
to "participate fully" in the Diplomatic Conference of 1974-77 that gave rise to
the Additional Protocols, but were not given a vote.195 These movements were
invited due to the "paramount importance of ensuring broad participation" and
the recognition that "the progressive development and codification of
international humanitarian law applicable in armed conflicts is a universal task
in which the national liberation movements can contribute positively." 96
Although states reserved their positions regarding whether this created a
precedent, 197 and historical circumstances may make such invitations difficult
to replicate, 98 the example has been cited as a broader model. 199 This would
raise practical difficulties, however, as to which groups would be allowed to
participate and the modalities by which they would do so.
In terms of an indirect role in the negotiating process, mechanisms could
be adopted in diplomatic conferences to allow armed groups to feed their views
into the conferences even if they were not given a formal role in treaty
negotiations.200 NGOs and international organizations could convene pre-
conference meetings with armed groups in order to solicit their views and
communicate these to the conference delegates. For example, shortly before the
Second Review Conference of States Parties to the Ottawa Convention, Geneva
Call convened a meeting of signatories to its Deed of Commitment. The
participants of that meeting issued a Declaration to the Second Review
201
Conference that, inter alia, urged states to ratify the Ottawa Convention.
Interested states could do likewise. For example, in 2010, the Swiss Federal
Government together with the Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian
Law and Human Rights convened a meeting with armed groups to ascertain
195. Res. 3(I) (Mar. 1, 1974), in I OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE ON
THE REAFFIRMATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW APPLICABLE IN
ARMED CONFLICTS, 1974-1977, at 238 (1978) [hereinafter OFFICIAL RECORDS].
196. Id.
197. The Final Act, in OFFICIAL RECORDS, supra note 195, at 119 ("It is understood that the
signature by these movements is without prejudice to the positions of participating States on the
question of a precedent.").
198. The inclusion of national liberation movements may be an actor-specific case, given the
particular historical background against which the Diplomatic Conference took place, namely in a period
of decolonization. Even then, the movements that were invited were those that had been recognized by
regional intergovernmental organizations, and those that were not so recognized were not invited. Res.
3(I) (Mar. 1, 1974), in OFFICIAL RECORDS, supra note 195, at 238.
199. With varying degrees of caution, see de Beco, supra note 89, at 191-92; Jean-Marie
Henckaerts, Binding Armed Opposition Groups through Humanitarian Treaty Law and Customary Law,
27 COLLEGIUM 123, 127-28 (2003); and Sassbli, supra note 73, at 22.
200. CLAPHAM, supra note 60, at 42.
201. Although not a statement of armed groups on various substantive legal issues, and
although not formally part of the Review Conference, the Declaration does suggest the possibility of
indirect input on the part of nonstate armed groups to treaty negotiations. Declaration by Signatories,
supra note 113.
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their views on the concept of "ownership" of humanitarian norms by such
groups.202 Just as diplomatic conferences on international humanitarian law are
usually preceded by conferences of government experts, they could also be
preceded by conferences of armed groups to allow the views of such groups to
be ascertained and then presented to the conference delegates. Granting armed
groups a direct role in negotiations enables states and armed groups to interact
with one another, creates potential for compromise, and allows positions to be
developed in a way that setting out a static position ahead of a diplomatic
conference does not. Moreover, an indirect role will likely prove far less
controversial given that states may object to negotiating with armed groups and
may fear that granting such groups a direct role in negotiations is akin to
treating them on par with states.
Irrespective of whether armed groups are granted a direct or indirect role
in negotiations, they could be given the right to accede to, ratify, or unilaterally
accept multilateral treaties. If armed groups were given a role in negotiations
and then could ratify the multilateral treaty, this might suggest that they are
being treated on par with states, with all of the controversy that would entail. In
the alternative, armed groups could be given no role or a lesser role in
multilateral negotiations, such that states remain in control of the content of the
treaty, but be given the opportunity to accede to, ratify or unilaterally accept
these norms. For the idea of unilateral acceptance, we draw on the approach
taken in Additional Protocol I,203 while for the idea of accession, we point to
the exceptional case of the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic
acceding to the Geneva Conventions two years before Algeria gained
independence as a state.204
Regardless of whether armed groups are permitted to participate in
multilateral treaty negotiations or to ratify the resulting agreement, we argue
that armed groups should remain bound by existing treaty obligations as this
would help to ensure stability and prevent the uncertainty caused by starting
from a blank slate. Accordingly, armed groups could not unilaterally exempt
themselves from existing legal obligations. Importantly, they also would not be
able to impose obligations on a state without the latter's consent. Instead,
hybrid treaties would provide a mechanism by which armed groups could
express their commitment to abide by existing legal obligations or undertake
additional legal obligations. 2 0 5 Thus, as with unilateral declarations, the hybrid
202. See Armed Nonstate Actors and International Norms, ADH GENEVA, http://www.adh-
geneva.ch/policy-studies/ongoing/armed-nonstate-actors-and-protection-of-civilians (last visited Nov. 2,
2011).
203. Additional Protocol 1, supra note 81, art. 96(3).
204. See Instruments of Accession of the Algerian Republic to the Geneva Conventions, Aug.
12, 1949, (registered at Berne, 20 June 1960), in MOHAMMED BEDJAOUI, LAW AND THE ALGERIAN
REVOLUTION 199 (1961); Michel Veuthey, Learning from History: Accession to the Conventions,
Special Agreements, and Unilateral Declarations, 27 COLLEGIUM 139, 143 (2003). The accession was
accepted by some states and rejected by others. The compilation of the reactions of states is found in
ICRC Archives B AG 041-083 (Apr. 4, 1960-Aug.28, 1962) (on file with ICRC archives).
205. One issue to consider is the effect of inconsistent obligations under treaties and hybrid
treaties. To the extent that hybrid treaties create additional or higher burdens than currently exist under
treaties, any conflict between the two will be unproblematic. Where a hybrid treaty seeks to vary or
lower existing treaty standards, it would be subject to a number of constraints, including that hybrid
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treaty approach captures the benefits of involving armed groups in the process
of law creation while minimizing potential disadvantages.
3. Quasi-Custom
A third, more difficult, approach is to allow armed groups to play a role
in the creation of customary international humanitarian law. We contend that it
would be possible for armed groups to play a role in the creation of what we
term "quasi custom," but we acknowledge that the modalities for doing so are
difficult and that some of the potential downsides cannot be entirely mitigated.
A number of armed groups have publicized their practices and views with
respect to international humanitarian law.206 Some have published their codes
of conduct, which could be treated as akin to state military manuals, which are
regularly used as evidence of state practice or opinio juris for the purposes of
determining customary international law. 207 For example, the CPLA of China
adopted the Three Main Rules of Discipline (1927; reissued in 1947), the Six
Points for Attention (1928; reissued in 1947 as the Eight Points for Attention),
and the Four Policies for the Lenient Treatment of Captives (1928).208 Other
armed groups have issued internal orders, drafted constitutions, or created penal
codes, many of which contain international humanitarian law provisions. For
example, the Ejdrcito Zapatista de Liberaci6n Nacional (EZLN) of Mexico
enacted a Revolutionary Women's Law, the Nepalese CPN-M drew up a Public
Legal Code, and the LTTE in Sri Lanka issued a Child Protection Act. 20 Other
treaties could not undermine jus cogens norms or exempt states and armed groups from obligations
owed to third states and third-party beneficiaries. The precedence of treaty and hybrid treaty obligations
could be analyzed by general interpretive rules, such as lex specialis derogat legi generali and lex
posterior derogat legi priori. See generally Rep. of the Int'l Law Comm'n, 58th sess, May I-June 9,
July 3-Aug. 11, 2006, 251, U.N. Doc. A/61/10; GAOR, 61st Sess., Supp. No. 10 (2006) (discussing
conclusions of the ILC study group on the fragmentation of international law, including the application
oflex specialis derogat legi generali and lex posterior derogat legi priori).
206. There may be various motivations for this. Publication may be intended to promote
compliance with the relevant laws, it may have the aim or effect of influencing the development of
international law, or it may be for other reasons such as increasing the group's legitimacy, support, or
funding base.
207. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Galid, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Judgment, 1 31 n.50 (Int'l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 5, 2003) (citing the military manuals of Australia, Canada, Germany,
the Netherlands, New Zealand, the former Soviet Union, and the United States); 2 HENCKAERTS &
DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 3, at 1987-91(citing the military manuals of Argentina, Australia, Belgium,
France, Germany, New Zealand, and the United States, among others); see also THEODOR MERON,
HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN NORMS AS CUSTOMARY LAW 41 (1989) ("[M]anuals of military
law . .. providing for the implementation of humanitarian law norms as internal law should be accepted
as . . . evidence of practice, and sometimes as statements of opinio juris as well."); Charles Garraway,
The Use and Abuse of Military Manuals, 7 Y.B. INT'L HUM. L 425, 431-38 (2004) (stating that national
manuals provide evidence of state practice and opinio juris in relation to the states that issued them).
208. The practice of the CPLA is reprinted in He Xiadong, The Chinese Humanitarian Heritage
and the Dissemination of and Education in International Humanitarian Law in the Chinese People's
Liberation Army, 841 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 141, 144-45 (2001). For more recent examples, see
Prosecutor v. Sesay, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Judgment, 1 705 (Mar. 2, 2009) (reprinting part of the
Revolutionary United Front's Eight Codes of Conduct); and The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, The
Lahya [Code of Conduct] for Mujahids (2010), translated in 93 INT'L REV. OF THE RED CROSS 103
(2011).
209. Tamil Eelam, Tamil Eelam Child Protection Act (2006) (on file with authors); Communist
Party of Nepal-Maoist, United Revolutionary Peoples' Council, Public Legal Code, 2060 (2003/2004)
(on file with authors) (unofficial translation); Zapatista Nat'l Liberation Army (EZLN), Revolutionary
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armed groups have issued statements on particular international humanitarian
law issues,210 while still others have expressed disagreement with legal
interpretations given by U.N. special rapporteurs and human rights
organizations.211
The legal status of these materials remains contentious, however. For
example, the influential customary international humanitarian law study
concluded under the auspices of the ICRC collected and listed the practices of
armed groups, including the ELN of Colombia, the FARC of Columbia, the
RPF of Rwanda and the SPLM/A of Sudan, as well as certain unidentified
212armed groups, but ultimately did not utilize this "other practice" because its
legal significance was "unclear." 213 By contrast, the ICTY took into account the
practice of the CPLA, FMLN, and the Royalists in Yemen in determining that a
number of customary rules applied to noninternational armed conflicts. 214
We suggest that one way forward would be to develop a theory of quasi-
customary international law that would be based on the practices and views of
states plus actors other than states, including, in the present context, armed
groups. Calls to reformulate understandings of custom along these lines already
exist. For example, Arend argues that custom could be based on the practice of
all international actors, with different customs binding different types of
actors.215 McCorquodale points out that the ICJ statute's reference to custom
describes it as "general practice accepted as law" without requiring that
practice to be state practice alone.216 Sass6li and de Beco have both argued for
the practice of armed groups to be considered in the creation of customary
international humanitarian law.217 Yet these suggestions are not widely
supported and they also raise a variety of concerns (such as whether
incorporating the practice of armed groups would lead to a downgrading of
Women's Law (Dec. 1993), reprinted and translated in VOICES OF FIRE (Ben Clark ed., 1994).
210. See, e.g., Statement by the Opposition Movements, Justice and Equality Movement-
Sudanese Liberation Movement Unity, available at http://www.hdcentre.org/files/Statement%20by/
20the%20opposition%20movements 110708.pdf (last visited Nov. 2, 2011).
211. See, e.g., Statement, Sudan Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), Report of the Panel of
Experts Established Pursuant to Resolution 1591 (2005) Concerning the Sudan Issued 29 October 2009:
A Response from JEM (Nov. 18, 2009), available at http://www.sudanjem.com/2009/ll /report-of-the-
panel-of-experts-established-pursuant-to-resolution-1591-2005-concerning-the-sudan-issued-29-
october-2009/; Press Release, Karen National Union, Press Statement on Report of UNSG (Apr. 27,
2009), available at http://www.genevacall.org/resources/nsas-statements/f-nsas-statements/2001-
2010/2009-27apr-knu.pdf; Letter from National Democratic Front of the Philippines to Ban Ki Moon,
U.N. Sec.-Gen. (Nov. 24, 2008), available at http://www.philippinerevolution.net/statements/letter-of-
the-ndfp-nec-to-un-secretary-general-ban-ki-moon.
212. 2 HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 3, at 64, 77, 115, 126, 356, 412, 778, 870,
2882, 3610.
213. Id. at xxxvi. Elsewhere, however, one of the study's authors has advocated the inclusion of
the practice of nonstate armed groups in the determination of customary rules. Jean-Marie Henckaerts,
Binding Armed Opposition Groups through Humanitarian Treaty Law and Customary Law, 27
COLLEGIUM 123, 128-29 (2003).
214. Prosecutor v. Tadid, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory
Appeal on Jurisdiction, T 102, 103, 107 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995).
Nonetheless, in subsequent cases, the ICTY has not relied on the practice of armed groups. It is unclear
what (if anything) can be drawn from this subsequent practice.
215. AREND, supra note 68, at 177-78.
216. McCorquodale, supra note 28, at 498-99.
217. de Beco, supra note 89, at 191-92; Sassbli, supra note 73, at 6-7.
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customary law protections) and questions (such as what would happen if the
practice of states and armed groups diverged). To mitigate these concerns, we
suggest the following.
First, drawing inspiration from the way in which international law
addresses the customary law rights and obligations of new states, we contend
that armed groups should remain bound by existing customary international law
obligations. International law protects the stability of the legal system by
providing that new states remain bound by existing customary law obligations,
even if the new government or state played no role in the creation of those
obligations and therefore had no opportunity to persistently object during their
formation.218 We contend that armed groups should expect to be bound in the
same fashion.
Second, armed groups, acting alone, would not have the power to create a
new custom or undermine or change an existing custom. Such developments
would require some sort of consensus between armed groups and states. In this
way, armed groups could contribute to the process of developing customary
law, without being able to control its outcome. Whether the practice of armed
groups would help to change customary law would depend not just on its
generality and consistency, but also on the actions and reactions of states, thus
retaining a central role for state consent.
Third, when it comes to weighing the practice of armed groups and states
going forward, their practice need not be treated equally. The centrality of the
role of states in international law means that their practice should still be given
more weight. As with traditional notions of custom, state-empowered bodies
(such as courts and tribunals) will likely play a critical role in identifying and
articulating customary rules, allowing those bodies to evaluate conflicting
practices of states and armed groups in light of the broader interests of the
international community. If the views of armed groups were considered, there
might also be an argument for including the views of other affected parties,
such as civilians.
As can be seen, different options are possible. Quasi-custom would allow
armed groups to play some role in the creation of customary norms without
ceding all, or even equal, control to armed groups. At the same time, we
acknowledge that any theory of quasi-custom is likely to prove more
controversial in theory and difficult to implement in practice than recognition
of hybrid treaties and encouraging unilateral declarations, particularly since the
role of state action and consent in quasi-custom would be more attenuated and
there is a greater chance of ratcheting down humanitarian protections.
IV. CONCLUSION
Given that international law now regulates the rights and obligations of
many nonstate actors in addition to those of states, this Article asks whether
218. 1 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW: PEACE, supra note 4, at 14, §5; MALCOLM N.
SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 91 (6th ed. 1991); Hugh Thirlway, The Sources of International Law, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW 115, 122 (Malcolm D. Evans ed., 2d ed. 2006).
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some or all nonstate actors can and should play a role in creating international
law. Although we set out a general framework for approaching this issue, we
argue that this question cannot be answered in the abstract, as the answer
depends on the advantages and disadvantages of recognizing a particular
lawmaking role for the particular nonstate actor in question.
Focusing on one particular kind of nonstate actor, namely nonstate armed
groups, we contend that it is possible to move away from the traditional statist
approach to sources, which denies armed groups any role in law creation,
without moving to the extreme position of giving such groups complete control
over their obligations or equal lawmaking powers with states. To this end, we
have suggested various mechanisms (unilateral declarations, hybrid treaties,
and possibly quasi-custom) for giving armed groups an opportunity to
recognize existing obligations or undertake new ones, while reducing the risk
of placing them on par with states or downgrading international humanitarian
protections. We believe that these mechanisms provide a way to involve
nonstate armed groups in the creation of international humanitarian law while
respecting the crucial and primary role of states.
These proposals are likely to be controversial and to encounter theoretical
and practical objections. Nonetheless, they build on existing practices and have
the potential to improve armed groups' knowledge of and compliance with
international humanitarian law. They may create certain incentives for armed
groups to comply with international humanitarian law, such as a commitment
not to prosecute them for taking part in hostilities. They may also allow us to
distinguish between armed groups that are willing to comply with the law from
those that are not, thus providing a means by which armed groups can be
disaggregated. More broadly, these proposals create a framework for other
nonstate actors to engage in the creation of international law. For instance,
corporations might undertake unilaterally to abide by human rights obligations
or enter into hybrid treaties with states and international organizations. We can
expect states to resist the idea of granting any nonstate actors a role in law
creation, but that does not mean that recognizing such a role would be contrary
to the needs and interests of the international community as a whole.
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